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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 16, 1993, President Clinton signed into law the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).I He proclaimed that RFRA
reverses the Supreme Court's decision [in] Employment Division against
Smith, and reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of all
faiths in the exercise of their religion in a way that I am convinced is far more
consistent with the intent of the Founders of this Nation than the Supreme
Court decision. 2
The Smith Court had given an exceedingly narrow interpretation to the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, literally removing from its
protective umbrella most if not all substantial burdens on religious exercises
imposed by neutral and generally applicable laws. 3
The President's appraisal of RFRA as a statute designed to "reverse" a
Supreme Court opinion, and to "reestablish" a "better" judicial standard for
assessing certain Free Exercise Clause claims, echoed similar sentiments
expressed during the congressional development of RFRA.4 Such sentiments
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
2 Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 11 PUB. PAPERS
2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). The President also thanked the chaplains of the House and Senate
and especially the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, which played a "central role"
in drafting the legislation and working for its passage. The Senate adopted the RFRA bill by
a 97-to-3 vote, while the House approved by a voice vote. Id.
3 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionimn and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. Cit. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) ("The Smith decision is undoubtedly the
most important development in the law of religious freedom in decades... [but] Smith is
contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment.").
4 For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's definitive report recommending
passage of the bill that became RFRA openly announced that "the purpose of this Act is
only [sic] to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Smith." S. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
In the House Judiciary Committee's corresponding report, Congressman Henry J.
Hyde's "additional views" stated that the purpose of RFRA "is to overturn the 1990
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Oregon Employment Services Division v.
Smith 494 U.S. 872," and "to replicate the 'compelling state interest test' for the
adjudication of free exercise claims which was in place prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith." H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1993) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT] (providing additional views of Congressman Hyde and others).
RFRA on its face does not pretend to "reverse" or "overrule" Smith. Its only stated
purpose is "to restore [by statute] the compelling interest test," as set forth in pre-Smith
decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Or, as Congressman Hoyer put it,
[V/ol. 57:65
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sprang from an almost universal displeasure with the Court's Smith ruling
among religious groups, civil libertarians, and academics.5 Torrents of legal
criticism were launched at the decision.6 Agreeing that the Court had done
grave damage to the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause by limiting its
protection only to laws targeting religion, Congress joined the hue and cry
against Smith and enacted RFRA.
Seldom has Congress been inspired to express such quick indignation and
displeasure with a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court or been so
eager to overturn the substance of such a decision. 7 And never has Congress
enacted a statute imposing on the federal and state judiciary an obligation to
disregard a mode announced by the Supreme Court for interpreting and
applying a constitutional provision and to replace it with what Congress thinks
is a "better" interpretive approach.
If those are the true purposes, design, and effect of RFRA, then critical
constitutional questions emerge. Has Congress breached the wall of separation
between legislative and judicial power? Can Congress statutorily rewrite the
Free Exercise Clause in a manner contrary to the meaning given the Clause by
the Supreme Court? And can Congress then dictate to the courts, both state and
federal, and including the Supreme Court, the judicial standard of review or the
degree of judicial scrutiny to be applied in all judicial proceedings involving a
claim or defense alleging a violation of the congressional rewrite of the Free
Exercise Clause? Or, as Congressman Hyde asked during the RFRA legislative
hearings, do "we in Congress have the right to tell the [Supreme] Court what
standard of review it shall use on first amendment cases... ?"8
RFRA is a way by which "we can undo the harm of the Supreme Court decision in Smith."
139 CoNG. REC. H8715 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993). But "reversing" or "overruling" Smith,
and undoing the "harm" resulting from its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, are
precisely the purpose, design, and effect of RFRA.
5 Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1994); Douglas Laycock &
Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv.
209, 210 (1994); Wendy S. Whitbeck, Restoring Rites and Rejecting Wrongs: The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 18 SEToN HALL LEGIs. J. 821, 821-22 (1994).
6 See generally McConnell, supra note 3; Douglas Laycock, 7he Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
7 Congress not infrequently acts to override Supreme Court decisions construing
federal statutes. See, e.g., William M. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331 (1991); Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 425 (1992). Attempts to override constitutional interpretation are a different
matter entirely. See infra part VI.D.
8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
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The ultimate question is whether RFRA represents a congressional
intrusion upon the core function of the Supreme Court to interpret and apply
the Constitution in the course of deciding cases or controversies that arise
under the Constitution. It is precisely within that Article I case or controversy
context that John Marshall "emphatically" asserted that it is "the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 9
To answer those questions, we must first reread the Free Exercise Clause
and note the ways in which the Court gives substance to it. We examine the
nature of the so-called balancing test and the Court's use of that test in Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Then we review the Smith decision as a judicial
exercise in reading and applying the Clause. We pay particular attention to the
Court's refusal to follow in Smith what Congress has deemed to be the "better"
interpretive approach to the Free Exercise Clause-i.e., to require government
to prove a compelling governmental interest in enacting a neutral law and to
balance that interest against the burden on religious exercise. Next we examine
RFRA itself, its partial rewrite of the Free Exercise Clause, and how it
interfaces or conflicts with the interpretive techniques employed by the Court in
Smith. Finally, we address the constitutional implications of RFRA,
particularly in light of the separation of powers doctrine.
Subconm. on Cii and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 100 (1992) [hereinafter House Committee Hearings].
ACLU President Nadine Strossen, without identifying any particular constitutional
provision and relying instead on so-called "constitutional law shorthand," attempted to
answer Congressman Hyde's question in these terms:
Congress, of course, does that all the time. When it passes statutes which are to be
enforced by the courts, it is always imposing, indeed in many situations, much more
detailed standards for judicial enforcement. Here the general compelling State interest
test is simply constitutional law shorthand for telling the Court you have got to treat
religious freedom as a fundamental right. What that translates into in actual adjudication
is that any abridgement on such a right is subject to strict scrutiny. So, in fact, it is a
rather modest specification of the judicial review approach.
Id. Congressman Hyde did not offer or receive any satisfactory answer to his question, even
in his separate statement accompanying the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4.
9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Court has often
repeated this assertion of judicial supremacy in the context of Article II[ cases and
controversies. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[Ilt is the
ultimate responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.");
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("This [Marbury] decision declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.").
[Vol. 57:65
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II. THE NATURE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Understanding the constitutional problems associated with the Smith
decision, as well as with RFRA, first requires a reading of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion] .... ."10 This prohibition applies to the states by
incorporation into the "liberty" component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.11
The sparse language of the Free Exercise Clause makes it one of the many
majestic generalities of the Constitution. The questions of what is "free
exercise," what is "religion," or what is a law "prohibiting" free exercise, find
no answers in the wording of the Clause. 12 Nor does the Clause tell us whether
the critical word "law" refers not only to a law that targets the exercise of
religion but also to "neutral and generally applicable" laws that only
incidentally but substantially burden religious exercise.13 We get no guidance
from the Clause as to how to interpret those few words, or what standard of
review or degree of scrutiny applies to a "law prohibiting" free exercise. The
Clause itself leaves us in the dark as to whether we should balance the burden
on the individual's free exercise rights against some demonstrated and
compelling governmental interest in enacting and enforcing such a "law."
One final interpretive problem emerges: What remedy does the Clause
provide? Does it contemplate or require courts to grant religious exemptions
from neutral and generally applicable laws that substantially affect or burden
religious exercises?14 The face of the Clause, of course, offers no clue as to the
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
11 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment .... The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.").
12 In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879), the earliest free exercise
case, the Court observed: "The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must
go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we
think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted." For
a discussion of the meaning of the word "prohibiting," see Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (holding that a law must coerce
in order to constitute a burden on religious exercise).
13 Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader
Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 184-85
(1992).
14 See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Or'gins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990).
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answer to that query.
Thus the Free Exercise Clause is not one of those constitutional provisions,
like the Article I, Section 3 provision that the Senate of the United States "shall
be composed of two Senators from each State," that are self-defining and self-
executing. The Clause cries out for interpretation. There are differing ways to
give meaning to the Clause, dependent on the interpretive techniques and
constitutional philosophy employed by the Court.' 5 But in the hands of the
judiciary, the resulting interpretations become living and substantive parts of
the Clause itself. That the interpretations may change or develop over time is
but a reminder that "the content of constitutional immunities is not constant,
but varies from age to age." 16 So it is with the Free Exercise Clause.
Il. THE NATURE OF THE BALANCING TEST
In our constitutional system, the answers to all the foregoing questions are
emphatically left to the judiciary and to the Supreme Court in particular, acting
in its Article I capacity as the supreme arbiter and interpreter of the words of
the Constitution. 17 But to perform that high function and to read meaning into
15 Interpretation and philosophy will reflect, inter alia, the Court's underlying political
theory, its understanding of national and constitutional history, and varying definitions of its
institutional role. See generally Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 80
(1995); Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L.
RInv. 1022 (1978).
16 B Inw CARDOZO, THE NATURE oF THE JuDIciAL PRocss 82-83 (1921).
Cardozo, after quoting John Marshall's "mighty" phrase that "we must never forget that it
is a constitution we are expounding," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819), further wrote:
A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles
for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that standard, and descends into
details and particulars, it loses its flexibility, the scope of interpretation contracts, the
meaning hardens. While it is true to its function, it maintains its power of adaptation, its
suppleness, its play.
CARDOZO, supra, at 83-84.
The interpretive variation over time is inevitable because, as Justice Frankfurter wrote,
"[Tihe ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it." Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966), Justice Brennan suggested
that Congress might also have the authority to give substantive meaning to constitutional
provisions: "[l1t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a
[Vol. 57:65
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such generalities as the Free Exercise Clause, the Court perforce must select
from various doctrinal methods of interpretation.18 Such established methods
include textual and literal reading of relevant provisions, structural analysis,
doctrinal and prudential analysis, use of precedent, concern for practical
consequences of a particular reading, examination of the history and tradition
surrounding a provision, searching for the framers' intent of a provision or its
original meaning, use of categorization and classification, recognizing and
perhaps prioritizing certain fundamental values and rights, balancing competing
constitutional values, and balancing individual rights as against governmental
interests. 19
The constitutional answers that these techniques produce depend largely on
the weight the Court may intuitively give to one or more of these modes of
interpretation. When the interpretive process employs a categorical approach,
for instance, it draws the dividing line between laws that fall outside the reach
of a constitutional provision and laws within the provision's protective reach.
Under such an analysis, the Court may announce a "categorical absolute" that
tolerates no governmental regulation whatever. The Court created just such a
per se rule in its earliest free exercise case,20 where it held that the Constitution
protects "first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires." 21
judgment that the application of New York's English literacy requirement... constituted an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." But this comment has
been severely limited by subsequent cases, and has never been used as the basis for
Congress' authority to enact legislation that directly contradicts a Supreme Court decision.
See infra part VII.B. for further discussion.
18 
"Because judicial power resides in the authority to give meaning to the Constitution,
the debate [about vesting in electorally unaccountable Justices the power to invalidate the
expressed desires of representative bodies] is really a debate about how to read the text,
about constraints on what is legitimate interpretation." William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 433, 435
(1986).
19 See WALTER F. MURPHY Er AL., AMmCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
289-318 (1986).
20 In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), the Court, after examining
Jefferson's and Madison's concerns about governmental intrusions on religious beliefs,
concluded that the Free Exercise Clause categorically deprived Congress of "all legislative
power over mere opinion, but. . . left [Congress] free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."
21 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Another example of a
categorical absolute emerging from the Court's reading of an amorphous constitutional
provision, the so-called negative Commerce Clause, is the "per se" rule of invalidity of state
legislation that on its face and in effect discriminates against interstate commerce; this "per
se" rule renders unnecessary any balancing of the state interest in burdening such
1996]
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Our prime concern here is with the interpretive technique by which courts
balance an individual right, such as the right freely to exercise one's religion,
against some compelling governmental interest in circumscribing or outlawing
the individual right. 22 This is generally known as the "balancing test," or, as
RFRA describes it, the "compelling interest test."23 Like all other interpretive
techniques, the balancing test is of judicial creation, finding no explicit support
in constitutional text.24
Balancing is a fairly late-comer in the arsenal of interpretive techniques,
commerce. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
Such a per se or categorical absolute is a normative principle since it is "the expression
of the Court's judgment as to whether the statute is compatible with the standard which the
Court has found or read into the Constitution." Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Uses qf
Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 NW. U. L. REv. 656, 671 (1977).
22 See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. Professor Louis Henkin has incisively
noted that there are two kinds of balancing tests in the constitutional interpretive sense. One
type of balancing is used to resolve perceived tensions between competing constitutional
provisions, such as between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause or
between property rights and freedom of expression. Balancing the interests involved in the
competing provisions, in Henkin's view, becomes a matter of constitutional interpretation or
construction. On the other hand, Henkin defines another kind of balancing as a
constitutional doctrine, applicable where a constitutional provision, like the Free Exercise
Clause, is read not as an absolute but as declaring conditional prohibitions that can be
divined only by balancing private rights and public good. Henkin, supra note 15, at 1046-
47. Our discussion here primarily involves the second kind of balancing defined by Henkin,
i.e., the judicial balancing between the substantive rights to religious exercise and the public
need to limit or regulate them.
For an excellent discussion of the balancing technique, including its history and its
merits and demerits, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age qf
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
23 In the vast body of free exercise case law, and for purposes of this Article, the terms
"balancing test," "compelling interest test," and "strict scrutiny" are used interchangeably.
Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review, the most exacting scrutiny a court
can give a law in measuring its constitutionality. It requires that the government prove that
its action is the least restrictive alternative in furtherance of a compelling interest. In some
areas of constitutional jurisprudence (such as equal protection), the choice of strict scrutiny
has typically meant that the law under review will not survive. In the free exercise context,
however, strict scrutiny has not functioned in this way; instead it has functioned as a
balancing of religious claims against governmental interests. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Categorization, Balancing, and Goverment Interests, in PuBLIC VALuEs IN
CONSTrr=rIONAL LAW 241, 242-43 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
24 That certain governmental interests can legitimately infringe the free exercise of
religion has been called the "implied exception [to the Free Exercise Clause's facially
absolute language] based on necessity." Laycock & Thomas, supra note 5, at 226-27.
[Vol. 57:65
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first appearing in majority opinions of the Court in the late 1930s and early
1940s.25 It has become a fairly common method, variously formulated, of
constitutional interpretation. One example is its use in interpreting the Free
Speech Clause in light of governmental interests in imposing time, place, and
manner restrictions.2 6 Another example is found in the jurisprudence of
interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause, where courts frequently
balance state interests in regulating some aspect of interstate commerce as
against the national interests in free trade.27 And, as we shall see below,
balancing has become a prominent method of interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause, balancing the individual's right to engage in religious exercises as
against governmental interests in regulating or outlawing such exercises.28
A major theme of the Smith opinion, written by Justice Scalia, is that the
balancing of competing interests is a function better left to the legislative
bodies.2 9 Judges, in other words, are less capable than popularly-elected
25 See Aleinikoff, supra note 22. Professor Aleinikoff further notes that, while the
Court never explained why balancing was a proper form of constitutional interpretation,
balancing
was a major break with the past, responding to the collapse of nineteenth century
conceptualism and formalism as well as to half a century of intellectual and social
change. Building on the work of Holmes, James, Dewey, Pound, Cardozo, and the
Legal Realists, and flying the flags of pragmatism, instrumentalism and science,
balancing represented one attempt by the judiciary to demonstrate that it could reject
mechanical jurisprudence without rejecting the notion of law.
Id. at 949.
26 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (balancing important
or substantial governmental interest as against any alleged restriction on free expression).27 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (balancing a
legitimate local public interest in a commercial regulation as against the regulation's effects
or burdens on interstate commerce).
28 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (balancing a free exercise
claim as against an important governmental interest in regulating religious exercise); see
also infra part IV.A.
29 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990). Justice Scalia follows
Justice Frankfurter in this restrained understanding of the role of the judiciary. "Judicial
review, itself a limitation on popular government, is a fundamental part of our constitutional
scheme. But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of
deeply-cherished liberties." Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940)
(Frankfurter, J.), overrded by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Justice Frankfurter thought that use of a higher standard of review in certain cases
concerning liberties (including religion) erases the distinction between courts and
legislatures. "If the function of this Court is to be essentially no different from that of a
1996]
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legislators of determining the proper balance between individual rights and
societal needs.30 But that debatable proposition totally misconceives the nature
of the judicial use of a balancing test. Courts develop and use balancing tests
not to reflect majoritarian accommodations, but to define constitutional
principles. In the judicial arena of constitutional interpretation, Professor Louis
Henkin has observed that "balancing has become a term of... specific import,
referring to explicit judicial weighing of competing values or interests to
determine constitutional doctrine or its application." 31 Even Justice Scalia
admitted this distinction when, in other contexts, he recognized that the Court
makes "'balancing' judgments in determining how far the needs of the State
can intrude upon the liberties of the individual. . . [because] that is of the
essence of the courts'finction as the nonpolitical branch."32 Indeed, legislative
balancing may be subject to judicial balancing precisely to ensure that the
lawmaking process and its product comport with the Constitution.
Thus, judicial balancing as "constitutional doctrine in the application of
[the Free Exercise Clause]... [can be] justified as a matter of constitutional
construction of [that Clause]." 33 Balancing is a product of judicial review of
constitutional claims, one that "softens the rigors of absolutes, makes room for
judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree. It provides an answer...
to what the Constitution means when the words do not say what it means." 34
One can only conclude that judicial balancing is not a replication of nor a
substitute for legislative balancing of competing interests. Legislative balancing
is either an expression of majoritarian resolution of competing political
interests, interest group victory, or commitment to minority protection; but it
differs from judicial balancing, which is done to resolve what the Constitution
legislature, if the considerations governing constitutional construction are to be substantially
those that underlie legislation, then indeed judges should not have life tenure and they
should be made directly responsible to the electorate." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 652
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30 Cy Justice O'Connor's statement in her concurring opinion in Smith that "courts
have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing state interests." Smith, 494 U.S. at 902
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
31 Henkin, supra note 15, at 1024.
32 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, I.,
concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia contrasts this appropriate balancing with what
he considers to be inappropriate balancing in the interstate commerce area, where balancing
is a "task squarely within the responsibility of Congress." Id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (where Justice Scalia balanced Fourth Amendment
privacy against school's interest in drug testing).
33 Henkin, supra note 15, at 1047.
3 4 Id.
[Vol. 57:65
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means when the words do not say what it means. The legislative result of
balancing is often imperfect, politically motivated, and harsh and insensitive to
individual interests. In fact, Justice Scalia readily admits that "leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in."35
As Justice Jackson once eloquently wrote, "[tihe very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." 36 The
establishment of a judicial balancing test is but one way of withdrawing the
Free Exercise Clause from the vicissitudes of political controversy.
IV. THE HISTORY OF BALANCING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Since comprehensive development of a federal free exercise jurisprudence
began in 1940, a recurring question has been whether the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits only laws that target the exercise of religion for specific disability, or
whether the Clause also prohibits laws that are generally applicable, facially
neutral, and minimally rational but that nevertheless substantially burden
religious exercise.37 Two interpretive approaches yield different answers to this
question. A categorical reading of the Clause yields a narrow protection against
facially discriminatory laws,38 while a balancing approach yields a broader
protection to religion from burdens regardless of the form or purpose of the
law.
The nineteenth (and some twentieth) century cases interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause have employed a categorical approach. Categorization has
been called "the taxonomist's style-a job of classification and labeling." 39
This interpretive technique draws the line between religious exercise that
comes within the protective ambit of the Free Exercise Clause and that
35 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
36 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
3 7 Compare the opinion of Justice Frankfurter with the dissent of Justice Stone in
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), ovemded by West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); compare Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); and compare the opinion of
Justice Scalia in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) with the concurring
opinion of Justice O'Connor in that case and with the opinion of Justice Souter in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hlaleah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (1993).
38 For a discussion of facial and formal discrimination, see Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hlaleah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
39 Sullivan, supra note 23, at 241. "When categorical formulas operate, all the
important work in litigation is done at the outset." Id.
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religious exercise which does not. It draws that line by determining what is
properly within the state's function: religion is protected from illegitimate
state action, but not from legitimate state action. Initially, then, the
categorical approach focuses not so much on defining the scope of rights as
on "interpreting the proper justifications for exercises of political
authority."40 For more than a century, for instance, beliefs and
ecclesiastical decisions on theological matters have been absolutely
protected from government regulation because there is no legitimate role
for the state in these areas. 41 The state is forbidden from setting any
religious orthodoxy; thus, there is no proper justification for government
regulation of belief "as such." 42
In addition to protecting religious belief, the categorical approach
offers some protection to religious conduct. Here the focus continues to be
on the legitimacy of the government regulation. When government
purposely targets religious conduct alone for suppression or discrimination
(by a law's form or purpose), the reasons for such conduct "are simply
excluded from being acceptable bases for action. " 43 Since there are likely
no proper justifications for government regulation of this sort, religious
conduct that suffers from such legal disability comes within the ambit of
the Free Exercise Clause.44 But when government enacts or enforces
neutral, general laws, by appropriate authority and process, these can be
easily justified. Inadvertent burdens to religious conduct caused by such
neutral, general laws do not come within the protection of the Clause.45
Thus, one product of the categorical approach is a per se rule that general,
40 Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 711, 713 (1994).
41 In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Court drew the
distinction between religious beliefs and acts, thereby creating one category of beliefs
protected absolutely (within the ambit of the Clause) and another category of actions
subject to otherwise valid law (outside the Clause). Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679 (1871), a federal common law decision later constitutionalized in Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), held that religious decisions of the
highest decisionmaking authority of a church were protected absolutely from
government intrusion.
42 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). See generally Marci A.
Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54
OHIOST. L.J. 713 (1993).
43 Pildes, supra note 40, at 714.
44 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993).
45 The categorical approach thus subjects these laws to the lowest standard of
review, rational basis, despite their potential to burden religion.
(Vol. 57:65
1=E RFRA REVISION
neutral laws are outside the Clause's reach. 46
In 1963, after a period of interpretive transition,47 the Supreme Court
embraced the balancing approach. 48 Unlike the categorical approach, this
methodology focuses on defining the scope of the free exercise right and so
emphasizes not the form or purpose of the law but its effects on religious
exercise. And contrary to the per se rule that general and neutral laws are
presumed legitimate, the balancing approach recognizes that "on some
occasions official power must justify itself in a way that otherwise it need
not." 49 If religious exercise suffers an infringement, then the Court subjects the
law to the "most exacting" level of review, which requires the government to
demonstrate a compelling interest served by the legislation with no less
restrictive alternative available. If the test is not met, the Court strikes the law
with respect to the religious claimant, thereby carving out a religious
exemption. The Court has explained that it acts "not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest
estimates of our competence.... withhold the judgment that history
authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed." 50 Thus,
through balancing, religiously neutral laws are brought within the ambit of the
Clause.
46 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47 The seeds of the transition to balancing as the constitutional doctrine of the Free
Exercise Clause were planted by collateral developments in the Free Speech and Commerce
Clause areas in general, and by these cases in particular: Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 601 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting), rev'd, 319
U.S. 103 (1943); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). These two approaches--categorical and
balancing-"employ different rhetoric... [and tihe terms of rhetoric matter. They make
different arguments possible. They bring different factors into the foreground. You simply
cannot do everything with boxes [i.e., categories] that you can do with balancing." Sullivan,
supra note 23, at 253-54.
Despite this primary shift to balancing, many cases have continued to retain the marks
of the categorical approach. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (no
compelled affirmation of repugnant beliefs). As is the case for many areas of jurisprudence,
"categorization and balancing need not be regarded as competing general theories of the
First Amendment, but are more helpfully employed in tandem, each with its own legitimate
and indispensible role in protecting expression." John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1482, 1501 (1975).
49 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356-57 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
5 0 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
19'961
OHIO STA7ELAWJOURNAL
A. Balancing as Free Exercise Doctrine
Professor Henkin notes that "several clauses of the Constitution are read as
declaring conditional prohibitions that depend on balancing." 51 With signals of
movement toward this understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as early as
1940, the Court unequivocally adopted such a reading in the 1963 case of
Sherbert v. Verner.52 A Seventh-Day Adventist, fired from her job because she
would not work on her sabbath, was denied unemployment compensation. The
Court held that the denial operated like a tax on her religious practice,
burdening her religion without sufficient justification. Justice Brennan wrote
for the Court: "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation.'" 53 The state's concern that fraudulent
claims would be encouraged by creating a religious exemption was held not
compelling. Had it been, the state would still be required to "demonstrate that
no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing
First Amendment rights." 54
Here, balancing is not only interpretive technique; in this context, it is the
constitutional doctrine of the Free Exercise Clause. The substantive principle
developed in Sherbert is that the constitutionality of government action depends
entirely on the weighing process.55 On one side of the scale is the question
51 Henkin, supra note 15, at 1037.
52 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
53 Id. at 406-07 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
54 Id. at 407.
55 With Sherbert, balancing became the normative practice of determining
constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989);
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
Balancing would have been the constitutional doctrine in these cases had a substantial
burden been found: Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378
(1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Even precedent that had relied on the categorical approach was reinterpreted within the
balancing rubric: Sherbert read Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), as consistent with the principle that religious
conduct may be regulated by general or targeting law only if the conduct "posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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whether there exists a burden on the free exercise of religious conduct; on the
other, whether that burden is justified ("outweighed" or "overbalanced") by a
compelling state interest, and whether the government's conduct is the least
restrictive means of implementing such an interest. To engage in the judicial
balance and decide whether or not the burden is justified is the act of
"specifying" the principle; each balance shapes the free exercise norm and
"render[s] it determinate in a context to which it is relevant but in which it is
(until specified) indeterminate." 56 In its grossest formulation, the doctrine of
the Free Exercise Clause after Sherbert is this: The government may burden
religion when the governmental or public necessity exceeds the burden; the
government shall not burden religion when the burden outweighs the
governmental or public interest.
The substantive principle that religious claims and government interests
must be balanced can be applied by "ad hoe balancing" or by "definitional
balancing" (which applies the result of a balance to a class of cases).5 7
Sherbert's balance was done in an ad hoc fashion; that is, it did not produce a
rule for general application in other cases. 58 Ad hoe balancing also
characterized Wisconsin v. Yoder,59 the decision often referred to as the high
water mark of free exercise. Amish parents were granted an exemption from
the last two years of the compulsory education requirement for their teenage
children. The Court found that "a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests." 60
Ad hoc balancing calls for a highly fact-specific examination of both the
religious and governmental sides of the balance. In Yoder, the Amish lifestyle
and beliefs were assessed with great particularity; the government's interest
was assessed in particular relationship to the Amish, with the Court finding that
the state's "interest in compelling school attendance of Amish children to age
56 Michael j. Perry, The Constitution, the Cours, and the Question of Minimalismn, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 84, 108 (1993).
57 See generally Henkin, supra note 15; Aleinikoff, supra note 22.
58 It was later interpreted to have done so, but by its own terms it did not produce a
rule for application in all cases of unemployment compensation. See infra text
accompanying note 75.
59 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
60 Id. at 214. The Court emphasized its role in "balancing" the liberty and state
concerns: "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215. The state was
unable to show how "its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish." Id. at 236. This differs from the
formulation in Sherbert, which emphasized the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest.
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16 emerges as somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance for
children generally." 61
Thomas v. Review Board62 involved a Jehovah's Witness who refused to
work in weapons manufacture, quit his job, and was subsequently denied
unemployment compensation. There the Court undertook a balance, in which it
determined that the "interests advanced by the state [such as concern over
widespread termination of employment for religious reasons] do not justify the
burden placed on free exercise of religion." 63 This, too, was a careful analysis
of each element of the balance, focusing on the particularities of the case.
Ad hoe balancing has been the subject of severe criticism over the years.
Appearing to call for unguided judicial discretion, ad hoc balancing smacks of
indeterminacy and subjectivity.64 As Professor Nimmer has pointed out, "ad
hoe balancing means that there is no rule to be applied, but only interests to be
weighed." 65 There is no standard by which one can measure whether a given
interest will be held of greater or lesser weight.66 Commentators worry that,
under such circumstances, the liberty claim will be vulnerable to the more
statist leanings of courts. 67
But this has not been the case under the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, the
most vigorous protection for free exercise has come in the ad hoe application of
the balance, as we see in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas. This is so because an
ad hoc balance gives a close look at the individual religious claimant and the
particular state interest as it burdens that claimant, and requires the government
to demonstrate either the absence of alternatives or the devastating effects the
particular exemption requested would have on its interest. The ad hoe, case-
61 Id. at 228-29.
62 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Had Sherbert been a definitional balance, the Court in Thomas
would not have engaged in a balance; the Court simply would have applied the rule in
Sherbert. Thomas itself is an ad hoe balance because the Court engages in a balance, uses
Sherbert as precedent, and does not articulate a rule to be applied in future cases.
63 Id. at 719.
64 Henkin, supra note 15, at 1048 (Balancing "is essentially unrelated to text .... As
substantive doctrine, it further attenuates the links between judicial review and the text of
the Constitution .... Together with related phenomena-tiers of scrutiny.. .- it gives a
view of judicial review that is intuitional. . . ."); see also David L. Faigman, Madisondan
Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 691 (1994).
65 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendnent
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 939 (1968).
66 Id.
67 [I]n the overwhelming majority of the major free speech cases in which the ad hoc
balancing approach has been applied, the weighing of interests has come out on the side
which opposes freedom of speech." Id. at 940.
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specific and fact-intensive analysis benefits the religious claimant. 68 For
instance, once a burden is shown, it is very difficult for the government to
show that the particular law or policy being challenged embodies a compelling
governmental interest. Even if its law does reflect a paramount interest, it is
very difficult for the government to show that it had no other way of achieving
its goal, or to prove that carving out an exemption from that law for this person
or group, or similarly situated persons or groups, would irreparably disrupt its
ability to carry out its compelling goal vis-.-vis those not exempted. It is
particularly difficult for the government to make this showing where the burden
is on a minority religious group and the effects of any exemption are limited.
B. The Development of Definitional Balancing
Given the criticisms of ad hoe balancing as a general constitutional
interpretive technique, commentators have noted that it "has to be
circumscribed and domesticated." 69 In the free exercise context, that process of
"domestication" began with the growth of definitional balancing, balancing that
generates a rule applicable in other cases. 70 The balance done in one case
determines that some classes of religious claims are presumptively outweighed
by the state's interest (or vice versa). While commentators have called for
definitional balancing as the more principled balancing technique, the Court's
increasing reliance on it has produced little protection for religious claimants.
Definitional balancing acts like a compromise between the categorical
approach and ad hoc balancing. 71 The particularity of both the religious claim
68 See William B. Ball, Accountability: A View from the Trial Courtroom, 60 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 809, 812 (1992) (Sherbert and Yoder are "fact intensive," rendering the
evidentiary record very important); accord Berg, supra note 5, at 20 ("institut[e] a case-by-
case 'close scrutiny' of government actions that harm religion... without setting up a
virtual per se rule against such effects").69 Henkin, supra note 15, at 1049.
70 See Alenikoff, supra note 22, at 948 ("balancing that establishes a substantive
constitutional principle of general application"). Rough equivalents to ad hoc and
definitional balancing have been referred to as balancing "at the margin" (scrutiny of the
government's interest in preventing the specific exemption being requested) and balancing
"in gross" (scrutiny of the government's interest in preventing the undermining of the law in
society). See generally Berg, supra note 5, at 194; Ira C. Lupu, Of Tme and the RFRA: A
Lanyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 171 (1995).
71 See generally Faigman, supra note 64; Nimmer, supra note 65. But cf. Aleinikoff,
supra note 22, at 979-81:
"definitional" balances are often undermined by new interests or different weights for
previously considered interests. This leads to a] fragility of a definitional balance and
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and the government's interest-the focus of ad hoc balancing-is gone. Instead,
the Court evaluates the claimed liberty against social interests at a high level of
generality (and consequent abstractness) in order to produce a rule directly
applicable in future cases without the need to balance.72 Definitional balancing
thus yields classes of protected 73 and unprotected74 activity.
Some of the earlier decisions that typified ad hoc balancing began to be
reinterpreted as definitional balancing. Sherbert and Thomas, each earlier
produced by ad hoc balancing, came to be understood to govern the area of
unemployment compensation. The general principle that they were now
understood to yield was that the state cannot "condition receipt of
[unemployment] benefits upon conduct proscribed by religion or deny benefits
because of conduct mandated by religion."75
the artificiality of the distinction between "definitional" and "ad hoc" balancing. New
situations present new interests and different weights for old interests. If these are
allowed to reopen the balancing process, then every case becomes one of an "ad hoc"
balance, establishing a rule for that case only. Balances are "definitional" only if the
Court wants to stop thinking about the question.
72 David L. Faigman, Measuring Costtionality Transactionally, 45 HAST GS LJ.
753,779 (1994), writes that the level of generality may not be consistently measured:
Balancing should require congruence between the levels of generality on each side
of the scale. In contrast to ad hoc balancing, we would expect that both the
government's interests and individual liberty would be calculated generally in
definitional balancing.... In practice, however, courts regularly violate this symmetry
by balancing a generalized or abstract factor on one side of the equation while the other
side is described in concrete, case-specific terms.
Id.
This led, over time, to a narrowing of what constituted a burden on religion and an
expansion of what constituted a compelling interest. James E. Ryan, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1414
(1992); see also Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 782 (1992). Because of this weakening, definitional
balancing is often mistaken for an abandonment of strict scrutiny and adoption of
intermediate scrutiny.
73 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
74 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1970).
75 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
This "rule" was applied in Hobble and Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489
U.S. 829 (1989). This is not simply the application of precedent. Because Hobbie and
Frazee were sufficiently distinct from Sherbert and 7homas, the Court could have engaged
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The Court's definitional balancing in United States v. Lee76 did not
produce a general rule quite so hospitable to religious claimants. Amish
employers sought an exemption from having to pay into the social security
taxation system, because they did not use the system; care for community
elders was a part of their religious life. Had the Court engaged in an ad hoe
balance, it would have been hard to deny the claim, as it was structurally
similar to Yoder there was a clear burden on free exercise, a showing of a
compelling interest of the state in maintaining a social security system for the
elderly, but no showing that the social security system would in any way be
endangered by providing this exemption for these Amish employers. In fact, an
exemption already existed for self-employed Amish, and this lawsuit simply
sought to rationalize the government's treatment of all-Amish businesses.
But the Court chose a definitional balance that announced a rule far beyond
the Amish community. While a burden on their religion was established, so
was an "overriding governmental interest" in preservation not of the social
security system but of a uniform federal taxation scheme free of judicial
exemptions. The government's interest was defined at a very high level of
abstraction, the hallmark of definitional balancing. For the Court to carve out
an exemption would mean that the floodgates would open: the entire structure
of federal taxation would be vulnerable to any religious objections to payment
of any tax.
As a definitional balance, Lee's result could then be applied in other cases
without having to engage in the balance. The case actually gave rise to two
lines of cases in which all the religious claimants failed: one held general,
religion-neutral tax laws constitutional; 77 the other held internal government
decisionmaking constitutional. 78
Much criticism of the Court's application of the strict scrutiny standard of
review has centered on the fact that so many religious claimants lose. In fact,
this "win-loss record" was a major justification for Smith's rejection of
balancing: Justice Scalia did not think the compelling interest test controlled in
more than a handful of cases-and those were all ad hoe balances. Yet it seems
more likely that the Court's record on free exercise resulted not from a failure
to use strict scrutiny, but from implementing strict scrutiny with an
overemphasis on definitional balancing. Justice O'Connor has held firm to the
in ad hoe balancing in each case.
76 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
77 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990);
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
78 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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belief that strict scrutiny has indeed been applied consistently, 79 and that the
success of the government in many cases simply shows the judiciary's ability
"to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state
interests." 80
C. Inching Back to the Categorical Approach
A return to a categorical methodology was suggested as early as 1982.81
The movement (not isolated to this Clause)82 was felt by the late 1980s, when
the Court began to return to making substantive distinctions between laws
within and outside the scope of the Free Exercise Clause based upon whether
7 9 Justice O'Connor noted:
One can ... glean at least two consistent themes from this Court's precedents.
First, when the government attempts to deny a free exercise claim, it must show that an
unusually important interest is at stake, whether that interest is denominated
"compelling," "of the highest order," or "overriding." Second, the government must
show that granting the requested exemption will do substantial harm to that interest,
whether by showing that the means adopted is the "least restrictive" or "essential," or
that the interest will not "otherwise be served."
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
81 Justice Stevens, concurring in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), called for
the presumptive constitutionality of otherwise valid tax laws that are entirely neutral in
general application, regardless of any burden on religious exercise. Id. at 263. Similarly, in
1986, Chief Justice Burger wrote, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), that
[tlhe test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder is not appropriate in this setting. In
the enforcement of a facially neutral and unjformly applicable requirement for the
administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of people, the Government
is entitled to wide latitude. [Instead], the Government meets its burden when it
demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and
unjbnn in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest.
Id. at 707-08 (emphasis added).
82 Professor Kathleen Sullivan notes that the movement from a balancing approach to a
categorical approach is a more general trend in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
naming Justice Scalia a leader of this movement. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 241.
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there existed proper justifications for government regulation of religious
conduct. For religious claims arising in the military and prison contexts, the
Court adopted a far more deferential standard toward the professional
judgments of military83 and prison officials. 84 Because neutral, general
regulations are legitimately within the authority of these officials, inadvertant
burdens on religious exercise resulting from such regulations are not
constitutionally cognizable. Thus, the Court eschewed a balancing approach
and returned to a categorical methodology for these populations.
It must be noted that the Court's determination that it is "ill-equipped" and
"ill-suited" to disturb what other units of government have done, though often
called an "institutional" decision,8 5 is nonetheless a substantive determination
of the meaning of the Constitution.86 The Court does not abstain from
adjudicating, as it does in situations of political questions.8 7 Deference to the
"institutional competence" of military and prison officials translates directly
into the substantive meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The vast majority of
religion claims in the military and prison settings are categorically excluded
from its protective reach.88
Thus, on the eve of the Smith decision, while the military and prison cases
had been set aside for different treatment, all other cases continued to be
83 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The judiciary must give
great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest. Not only are courts "ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have". . . but the military authorities have been charged by the
Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy.
Id. at 507-08.
84 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Prison regulations are
constitutional so long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id.
at 349. Measuring the constitutionality of prison administration policies in this way "reflects
the respect and deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of
prison administrators" and "avoids unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into problems
particularly ill suited to 'resolution by decree.'" Id. at 349-50.
85 See generally Joanne C. Brandt, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The
Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995).
86 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly
on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 481,492-99 (1990) (asking why the
Court's refusal to balance-for reasons of institutional incapacity-should mean that "the
court has passed on the ultimate constitutionality of the conduct of the government actor").
87 See infra part V.B.
88 The fact that some minimal review remains does not vitiate this labeling. Some form
of rational basis review is always involved when the court takes jurisdiction.
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governed by the balancing approach, whereby any law-including a religiously
neutral law-that substantially burdens religious conduct requires a balancing
between the governmental interest at stake and the burden thereby imposed on
that conduct. The categorical approach, as traditionally understood as the
methodology which excludes religiously neutral laws from the reach of the
Clause, had made but a slight appearance on the horizon.
V. THE NATURE OF THE SMITH DECISION
Smith rejected the balancing approach for generally applicable, facially
neutral laws and with it the doctrinal formulation that the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause is dependent upon a judicial weighing of religious claims and
governmental interests. Justice Scalia's opinion illustrates some of the major
interpretive problems and options that adhere to any judicial reading of the
Clause. What kind of a "law" respecting the free exercise of religion is
rendered unconstitutional by this Clause? Does the word "law" refer to any
statute or regulation, however neutral or generally applicable it may be, that
substantially burdens one's exercise of religious beliefs? Or does the Clause
refer only to those non-neutral laws that specifically target religious exercises?
And what kind of laws that burden religious exercises should be subjected to
strict scrutiny by way of balancing governmental interests and the resulting
religious burden?
The very first sentence in Justice Scalia's opinion defines the interpretive
issue as:
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of
Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use [by Native Americans]
within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and
thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed
from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use.s9
The answer, says the Smith opinion, is that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law
89 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). See also Justice O'Connor's
separate opinion in Smith, stating that the constitutional question upon which the Court
granted certiorari in Smith was "whether the Free Exercise Clause protects a person's
religiously motivated use of peyote from the reach of a State's general criminal law
prohibition." Id. at 891. But compare Justice Souter's concurring remarks in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2247 (1993), to the effect that
neither party in Smith squarely addressed the proposition that the Court there embraced,
i.e., "that the Free Exercise Clause was irrelevant to the dispute" arising out of a neutral
and generally applicable law.
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of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion proscribes (or prescribes).'" 90 As interpreted by
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause affords no constitutional haven for those
whose religious activities would violate a neutral law of general applicability.
That interpretation means that the Clause has been diminished, that its
protection extends only to those religious exercises that are targeted by a non-
neutral law that may lack any compelling governmental interest.
In thus reading and interpreting the sparse text of the Free Exercise Clause,
the Smith Court had to choose between the two interpretive methodologies
embedded in the Clause's history: categorical and balancing. For generally
applicable, facially neutral laws, Smith follows the first approach, and rejects
the second.
A. The Categorical Approach
The Smith Court chooses to read the words "prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]" as saying that "if prohibiting [or burdening] the exercise of
religion is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
not been offended." 91
In other words, Smith reads the words of the Clause to exclude from its
scope the category of laws that are religiously neutral and generally applicable
in nature.92 This reading limits the reach of the Clause to what Justice
O'Connor's separate opinion calls "the extreme and hypothetical situation in
which a State directly targets a religious practice. .. [and thereby] relegates a
serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimum scrutiny that the
Equal Protection Clause already provides." 93
This categorical exclusion of neutral laws is said to be "a permissible
reading of the text" of the Free Exercise Clause, a reading that Justice Scalia
90 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The internal quotation in the above Smith quotation is from
the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982). Justice Stevens, the first to articulate a return to a categorical methodology in Lee,
joined the majority opinion in Smith. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
92 See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(public indecency regulation that is general and is "not specifically directed at expression
... is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663 (1991) (a general law is not subject to strict scrutiny simply because it is enforced
against the press).
93 Sth, 494 U.S. at 894 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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believes from the "vast majority" of past decisions to be the "correct one." 94
Naming early categorical articulations of the Clause (one of them overruled
nearly fifty years before) as controlling precedent,95 Justice Scalia crafted the
Clause's narrow reading. As later explained in Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Chrch of the Lakami Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah:
The terms "neutrality" and "general applicability" are not to be found
within the First Amendment itself, of course, but are used in [Smith] and
earlier cases to describe those characteristics which cause a law that prohibits
an activity a particular individual wishes to engage in for religious reasons
nonetheless not to constitute a "law ...prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 96
The Smith opinion adds that the second or broader reading of the Clause,
one that would include neutral and generally applicable laws within its
proscription, would produce a "constitutional anomaly" in the form of "a
private right to ignore generally applicable laws." 97 Under such a broader
reading, says the Smith Court, "every [generally applicable] regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. . . would open
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind."98 That prospect, in the Court's
94 Id. at 878. In the Smith case, Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
vigorously disagreed with the "correctness" of Justice Scalia's textual reading of the Free
Exercise Clause, as well as with his assertion that Court precedents supported that reading.
In their view, the Clause encompasses all laws that substantially burden religious exercises,
including those laws that are facially neutral and generally applicable, and that most if not
all the Court precedents had consistently so read the Clause. Id. at 891, 907. In Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2248 (1993), Justice Souter in
concurrence noted that "Smith did not assert that the plain language of the Free Exercise
Clause compelled its rule, but only that the rule was 'a permissible reading' of the Clause."
95 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), ovemded by West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879).
96 haleah, 113 S. Ct. at 2239.
97 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. Justice Scala finds some solace for this proposition in
United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). There the Court rejected a free exercise
claim that federal criminal laws against polygamy could not constitutionally be applied to
religious practitioners of polygamy. "To permit this," said the Court, "would be to make
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
98 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Justice Scalia misses the distinction between ad hoe and
definitional balancing. The Court then proceeds to outline a "parade of horribles," generally
applicable and neutral laws that would be subject to judicially created religious exemptions.
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view, is sufficient reason for reading the Free Exercise Clause narrowly,
confining its reach to laws that are non-neutral, or not generally applicable, and
that are targeted directly at religious exercises. 99
The Smith Court's rejection of balancing and the consequent exclusion of
neutral, generally applicable laws is not, nor can it be, as comprehensive a
claim as Justice Scalia asserts. Smith does not explicitly overrule fifty years of
precedent. Numerous cases involving generally applicable, facially neutral laws
have read the Clause to mean that such laws are subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny. The solution in Smith is to reinterpret these cases. Where the religious
claimant lost, the Smith Court questions whether strict scrutiny was actually
applied. Where the religious claimant prevailed, the Smith Court creates a new
category of "hybrid" rights. Justice Scalia explains,
[tihe only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press. 100
What this "hybrid" right looks like in the post-Smith world has not been
determined. 101 Presumably, however, a neutral, generally applicable law that
implicates the Free Exercise Clause as one of several constitutional claims
The Court includes in its parade compulsory military service laws, tax laws, health and
safety regulations such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination
laws, drug laws, traffic laws, social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child
labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for
equality of opportunity for the races. Id. at 889. In the Court's words, "[tihe First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this." Id.
9 9 As stated in Hialeah, if a law fails to satisfy the Smith requirements of neutrality and
general applicability, the law "must be satisfied by a compelling governmental interest and
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226. In other
words, such non-neutral or targeted laws are within the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause
and its proscription.
100 Srith, 494 U.S. at 881 (emphasis added). Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296.
(1940) (strict scrutiny applied to burdens on proselytizing) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (strict scrutiny applied to burdens on parents' decisions concerning
religious upbringing of children) are explained under this rubric. The line of unemployment
cases, beginning with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), continues to enjoy strict
scrutiny under another theory: "[I]ndividualized assessments" made by the government
need close judicial examination because of the capacity for discrimination against religion.
101 See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.
1991) (zoning prohibition on church in city downtown may implicate "hybrid" rights). But
the "hybrid" concept has been left largely undeveloped by lower federal courts.
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continues to enjoy protection under a balancing approach. But this balancing is
not part of the doctrine of the Free Exercise Clause; it is doctrine for the new
hybridized grouping of constitutional provisions, of which free exercise is only
apart and the contours of which we cannot yet see.02 The doctrine now is that
only religiously-targeted and non-neutral laws come within the ambit of the
Free Exercise Clause.103
In terms of understanding the RFRA reaction to the Smith decision, the
significance of the case is to be found somewhere other than in the correctness
or wrongness of its narrow reading or interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, or in the convincing or unconvincing nature of its rationale, or in its
consistency or inconsistency with prior case law.14 What is important is the
fact that the Smith Court, for better or worse, has performed a legitimate and
exclusive judicial function of reading and interpreting a Clause of the
Constitution in the context of an Article III case or controversy. It has assumed
once again "the ultimate responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution." 10 5
In accepting that responsibility with respect to interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court has employed a controversial but permissible
methodology of reading and interpreting the text of the Clause itself, no
attention being paid to the so-called intent of the framers of that provision. 1 6
That process has resulted in what Justice O'Connor has described as a "single
categorical rule" stemming from "a strained reading of the First
10 2 See Faigman, supra note 72, at 772-73.
103 Laws that are targeted at religious practice must "be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Hialeah, 113
S. Ct. at 2226. These laws "must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny" and "will survive
strict scrutiny only in rare cases." Id. at 2233. This is not a per se rule in which such a law
is automatically held unconstitutional. However, Hialeah's form of strict scrutiny appears to
be less like the balancing developed in the free exercise area and more like the strict version
developed in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence. See supra note 23.
104 For a devastating critique of Smith's reading of the text of the Free Exercise
Clause, as well as Smith's mistreatment of free exercise history and judicial precedents, see
McConnell, supra note 3; Laycock, supra note 6.
Such criticism of Smith is well-founded. As compared to ad hoe balancing, a
categorical approach that excludes neutral, generally applicable laws from the Free
Exercise Clause provides little protection for religious conduct. In the post-Smith
period, several states that wanted to afford greater protection to religious exercise
chose to interpret their own constitutions to require balancing as state constitutional
doctrine. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious
Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275.
105 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
106 McConnell, supra note 14.
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Amendment," 107 or in what Justice Souter has called the "Smith rule"108 which
excludes from consideration incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by
neutral, generally applicable laws.
B. The Balancing Approach
The Court having thus constructed a categorical absolute from its
"permissible" and "preferred" reading of the Free Exercise Clause, it is
understandable that it rejects balancing as constitutional doctrine for neutral,
generally applicable laws. An absolute is an absolute. A law that is deemed
totally and absolutely outside the textual realm of a constitutional proscription
need not be subjected to strict scrutiny in order to justify its exclusion from that
proscription. 109
The inappropriateness of balancing is a natural consequence of the Smith
Court's narrow reading of the textual scope of the Free Exercise Clause. It is,
of course, possible to read the words "no law... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]" more broadly to include "a generally applicable law that requires
(or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or
requires)." 110 These words were read this way for decadeg. In fact, Justice
Souter noted in Hleah that "a respectable argument may be made that the pre-
Smith law comes closer to fulfilling the language of the Free Exercise Clause
than the rule Smith announced." 11 But "[a]s a textual matter," concluded the
Smith Court, "we do not think the words must be given that meaning."1 12 And
10 7 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment).108 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of HIaleah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
109 Such a law is presumptively valid. A determination of its invalidity depends upon
some constitutional provision other than the Free Exercise Clause or on the "hybrid"
concept, which aggregates the Free Exercise Clause with other enumerated and
unenumerated rights.
110 &nih, 494 U.S. at 878.
111 Hiateah, 113 S. Ct. at 2248.
112 &nth, 494 U.S. at 878. Having chosen to read the Free Exercise Clause
categorically, in the form of an absolute exclusion of religiously neutral laws, the Smith
opinion then adds additional reasons for rejecting any reading of the Clause that "a religious
exemption [from a neutral and generally applicable law] must be evaluated under the
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner." Id. at 882-83. Following an analysis of prior
Court precedents, an analysis that draws heavy fire from the dissenting Justices, Srifth
concludes "that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of
our precedents, is to hold the [balancing] test inapplicable to such [free exercise] challenges
[to neutral and generally applicable laws]." Id. at 885.
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here again, however one may disagree with Smith's textual reading of these
imprecise words, the Court is merely performing its unique and exclusive
function of being the supreme interpreter of the majestic generality of the Free
Exercise Clause in the context of an Article III case or controversy. As that
interpreter, the Court legitimately may read the Clause narrowly or broadly, to
find or create categorical distinctions in the words, or to pour content into the
generalities by resort to history, tradition, original intent, precedent,
practicalities, or balancing of competing interests. All of this is but a reflection
of the fact that a word, especially a word in the Constitution, "is not [a]
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." 113
The Smith Court suggests that, if religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws are to be made, it is far better that they be made by the political
bodies. Courts are said to be institutionally ill-equipped to engage in a
balancing battle among competing religious, social, and economic forces, to
"weigh the social importance of all [uniform and generally applicable] laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs." 114 Though this confuses the
difference between legislative and judicial balancing,115 Smith does not
represent an abdication of constitutional interpretation. The determination not
to subject the neutral, generally applicable decisions of political branches or
"expert" bodies to strict scrutiny review is itself the articulation of a
substantive constitutional norm: The law, if otherwise valid, is
constitutional. 116
113 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
114 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Smith Court concedes, as it must, that a balancing or
compelling governmental interest test is frequently used in other contexts, such as restraints
on the content of speech or differing treatments based on race. Id. at 885-86. But use of the
test in such other contexts is said not to "produce a private [and anomalous] right to ignore
generally applicable laws [as in Smith]," but rather to produce constitutional norms such as
"equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech." Id. at 886.
115 See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 86. One commentator remarks that Smith is "a decision about
institutional arrangements more than about substantive merits" and suggests that Smith is a
"political question case, holding that judicially manageable standards for the resolution of
Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking." Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in
Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Statutes
Revolving]; see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 743, 759-62 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, Trouble with Accomodation]. The labeling of
Smith as an "institutional" decision is inaccurate. While its rationale may invoke notions of
judicial limitations, Smith nonetheless defines and constitutes substantive free exercise
doctrine. Conkle, supra note 15, at 63-65.
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Smith having made clear its choice of reading a categorical absolute into
the Free Exercise Clause, all the discussion and debate in Smith over the merits
of a balancing test do not detract from the Court's bottom line: The balancing
approach, as we have known it, is no longer "constitutionally required." 117
VI. THE RFRA RESPONSE TO THE SMTH DECISION
Immediate public reaction to Smith did not focus on its fact-specific
holding: that Native American sacramental use of peyote could be criminalized
via a general prohibition. It focused instead on the Court's dramatic and
unanticipated rejection of balancing as the interpretive approach to the Free
Exercise Clause. Members of Congress soon joined the chorus of academic,
legal, and religious critics of Smith, calling it an infmous, disastrous,
unfortunate, mischievous, dastardly, and ill-advised opinion that should and
must be "overruled." 118 The tone of the congressional assault reflected the
Smith determined that "free exercise" means the right to be free from laws that directly
target, single out, or suppress religion without a compelling interest, which "also
determine[d] both the nature and scope of the right of religious freedom." Alan Brownstein,
How Rights Are In'inged. The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine,
45 HASmIGs LJ. 867, 868 (1994). "As a practical matter, deference to legislative and
administrative judgment... was as much an indication that the interests at stake were
presumptively compelling as it was the basis for forgoing the compelling interest standard
altogether." Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 276 (1994).
Commentators on RFRA mistakenly rely on the "distinction" between institutional and
substantive decisions about the Free Exercise Clause in their discussions of RFRA's
constitutionality. See infra parts VI and VII. The argument runs as follows: If Smith is a
substantive decision, RFRA is trying to contradict the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause, which it cannot do; but if Smith is an institutional decision, RFRA is not
contradicting constitutional doctrine and is therefore constitutional. See Douglas Laycock,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 252-53; Lupu, Statutes
Revolving, supra, at 60 (If Smith is a substantive interpretation, RFRA would suggest "that
Congress can simply override the Court on matters of substantive constitutional law."). This
distinction is unhelpful, because the "institutional" determination gives rise to a substantive
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
117 &mith, 494 U.S. at 890.
118 During the final Senate consideration of RFRA, Smith was simply referred to as
"wrong" and "wrongly decided." See, e.g., Senator Hatch's statements: "The Smith case is
wrong. It ought to be overruled," 139 CONG. REC. S14465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993), and
that "[tihe Smith case was wrongly decided and the only way to change it is with this
legislation." Id. at S14353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
The final House debates exhibited more drastic condemnation of Srath. See, e.g.,
Representative Nadler's remark that "[t]his legislation will overturn the Supreme Court's
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intensity of Justice O'Connor's complaint that the Smith holding "dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary
to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty."119 Congress focused
on legislating to reverse the decision by restoring generally applicable and
facially neutral laws to the presumptive graces of the Free Exercise Clause.
Typically, legislatures react to an unfavorable free exercise decision by
addressing its merits. After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, where the Court found that a government road through sacred lands
caused no constitutional burden on Native Americans even though their
religious traditions were put at risk of extinction, Congress denied the
appropriation for the road. 120 More typically, the response is in the form of a
substantive accommodation of the religious exercise at issue, often as a
statutory exemption. 121 After the Court failed to protect a Jewish military
officer in his practice of wearing a yarmulke in Goldman v. Weinberger,
Congress quickly reversed the decision by modifying military regulations so as
to permit unobtrusive headgear. 122 Such a substantive response was ultimately
disastrous decision [in Smith], which virtually eliminated the first amendment's protection of
the free exercise of religion." 139 CoNG. REC. H-2359 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
Representative Schumer referred to "the infamous case known as the Smith case [which]
rubbed against totally the American grain of allowing maximum religious freedom." Id. at
H2360. Representative Edwards likewise described Smith as "an unfortunate decision...
that put religious freedom in jeopardy in our country." Id. at H2357.
For discussion of the legislative hearings and debates leading up to RFRA's passage,
see generally Berg, supra note 5; Whitbeck, supra note 5.
119 Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
12 0 See Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of
Judicia Ovility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 583, 623 n.217 (1994) (discussing Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and subsequent congressional
action).
121 There are perhaps as many as two thousand statutory accommodations of religion
throughout the state and federal laws. Ryan, supra note 72, at 1445. See, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (finding constitutional the federal Equal Access
Act, which permits religious speech during noncurricular club activities on the same basis as
nonreligious speech); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987) (finding constitutional § 702 of Title VII, which exempts religious organizations from
the prohibition against discriminating in employment on the basis of religion); Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which requires employers to "reasonably accommodate" employees' religious
practices unless it would cause the employer "undue hardship"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (finding state tax exemption constitutional).
122 The decision, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), was overturned by Congress at 10 U.S.C.
§ 774 (1988).
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made to the Smith decision, at both state and federal levels. In 1991, Oregon
amended its controlled substance statute to permit religious use of peyote. 123
And in 1994, Congress amended the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
to include an explicit protection for the ritual use of peyote by Native
Americans (the AIRFA Amendment). 124
These legislative accommodations are common' 25 and legitimate. 126
Legislatures, both state and federal, routinely determine that for legislation
123 OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992 (Supp. VI 1994). This section provides that it is an
affirmative defense to any prosecution for manufacture, possession, or delivery of peyote if
it is used for religious purposes.
124 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996a (Supp. 1995). The American Indian Religious Freedom
Amendments of 1994 provide, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation
of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes is lawful and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession, or transportation, including
but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance
programs.
Id.
In congressional debates on the bill, it was clear that the Smith decision prompted the
action. Congressman Richardson stated that the bill
makes statutory the protection now provided by Federal regulation and the laws of 28
states for the religious use of peyote by Indian practitioners. This legislation to protect
the first amendment right of Indians to use peyote as a sacrament is made necessary by
the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
140 CONG. REc. 117156 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994).
125 See supra note 121.
126 Professor Hamilton writes:
When Congress acts under its Article I enumerated powers, it has an
obligation to act consistently with the principles of the First Amendment. Hence,
legislatures should have the power explicitly noted in Employment Division v.
Smith to carve exemptions for particular religions from generally applicable laws.
Congress may even be permitted to exceed the Court's threshold definition of
First Amendment guarantees, if it is acting pursuant to one of its enumerated
powers.
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOzo L.
REV. 357, 363 (1994).
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within their powers, they can choose to exempt or accommodate religion so
long as it does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. In fact, when Oregon amended its law to provide for a ritual
peyote exemption, it joined over twenty-five states that already had such an
exemption. 127 Religious exercise is also protected within detailed, far-
reaching statutory schemes, such as those that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of religion, inter alia, in housing, education, and employment.128
But RFRA was different. It sought not to respond to the holding of Smith
with an exemption or a detailed statutory scheme, but instead to respond
directly to the Court's new interpretive approach, to its narrowed determination
of what falls within the protective scope of the Free Exercise Clause. Because
of this goal, the problems facing the drafters of RFRA were unprecedented.
How does one draft a statute that forces the judiciary to undo the harm of the
Smith decision? How does one draft a statute that widens the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause? How does one draft a statute to ensure that all courts, state
and federal, will employ the balancing approach whenever any religiously
neutral law burdens the exercise of religion? And is it necessary-or even
possible-for such a statute to be a self-contained one, establishing its own
substantive religious exercise rights and its own balancing test for enforcing
those statutory rights?
The RFRA drafters purported to solve those problems by asserting several
unique propositions: that Congress may determine what is within the scope of a
constitutional protection contrary to the Supreme Court's reading of that scope;
that it may determine the proper interpretive approach for the judiciary to
define constitutional doctrine; that it may do this simply by asserting the
formalities of a cause of action; and that it may, in one legislative act, amend
all existing federal and state law.
A. Congress Restates the Free Exercise Clause
As we have seen, the core of the Smith ruling lies in its textual reading of
the Free Exercise Clause as categorically excluding from its scope those laws
that are religiously neutral and generally applicable in nature.129 This reading is
consistent with what was employed in some of the earliest free exercise
cases.130 But it is a reading vigorously contested by Justice O'Connor and the
dissenters in Smith. The Free Exercise Clause, writes Justice O'Connor, "does
not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target
127 Smdth, 494 U.S. at 917.
128 See generally Ryan, supra note 72.
129 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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particular religious practices." 131 The Court's free exercise cases "have all
concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly
burdening a religious practice." 132
The cornerstone of RFRA is its appropriation of Justice O'Connor's vision
of the Free Exercise Clause. Section 1(a)133 of RFRA states:
In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability .... 134
Standing by itself, this general statement adopts in statutory form the pre-
Smith scope of the Free Exercise Clause.135 Indeed, that is precisely what
RFRA wishes to restore. It should come as no surprise, then, that this
statement constitutes-and is intended to constitute-total disagreement with
Justice Scalia's narrow reading of the Clause.
Thus, we are witness to a direct conflict between Congress and the
Supreme Court over the proper judicial reading of a constitutional provision. 136
Congress is, of course, entitled to express its own independent views on
constitutional matters in the course of enacting legislation. 137 But the RFRA
"general" statement, in the context of the bitter legislative reaction to Smith, is
131 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (O'Connor, I., concurring in
judgment).
132 Id.
133 The Findings and Purposes of RFRA can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp.
V 1993). The operative sections are found at §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4. In this Article, a
reference to Section 1 means 2000bb-1 and so on.
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1 goes on to say that
government can substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if the government
demonstrates that application of the neutral law "is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1993).
13 5 This close connection to the Constitution has prompted the metaphor of statutes that
orbit the Constitution. See Lupu, Statmtes Revolving, supra note 116.
136 Other attempts to legislate in direct contradiction to constitutional decisions have
failed. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights:
Reflections on Proposed "Hwnan Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333 (1982) (regarding
the Human Life Bill that sought to overturn Roe v. Wade).
13 7 See LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 39 (2d ed. 1988)
(Congress has "the power and the duty to interpret the document [the Constitution] in a way
that may command the respect of others."). But Dean Paul Brest has observed that
Congress should not contradict judicial value judgments having a constitutional dimension.
Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutonal Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REy. 57, 105 (1986).
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the epitome of Congress' disagreement with this "infamous" and
"mischievous" decision. It has no greater substance than as a statement of what
Congress deems to be the better judicial reading of the Free Exercise Clause, a
reading found in the pre-Smith decisions of the Supreme Court and expressed
in Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Smith. The general statement thus
stands as a legislative rewrite of the Free Exercise Clause.
B. The RFRA "Findings"
The so-called "findings" expressed in RFRA further illustrate that this
statute is concerned solely with forcing a judicial correction of the Smith
"misinterpretation" of the Free Exercise Clause. Contrary to what the Smith
majority found, Congress, for the purposes of its own Free Exercise Clause
analysis, "found":
(1) [IThe framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion
as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution138
and;
(2) laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely
as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise. 13 9
An additional finding makes an obvious reference to the appropriate
standard of review to be employed in cases arising under the Free Exercise
Clause and expresses the constitutional value judgment that:
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification. 140
RFRA next makes two remarkable findings. These findings are remarkable
in the sense that these are statements that might appropriately be found in a
judicial opinion overruling Smith and restoring the use of the balancing test
where neutral laws substantially burden religious exercises. The first of these
findings focuses directly on the Smith decision and the congressional
dissatisfaction therewith:
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1).
139 Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
140 Id. § 2000bb(a)(3).
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Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.
14 1
That finding bears more than a symbiotic relationship to Justice
O'Connor's complaint that the Smith majority had disregarded what she
deemed to be the established constitutional doctrine of the Free Exercise
Clause.142
The second finding vents a pure judicial-type value judgment of the
feasibility of the judicially created compelling governmental interest. Tracking
nearly verbatim the language of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Smith, 143 Congress decided:
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is
a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests. 144
Many statutes contain findings that criticize the Court's statutory
interpretation in a particular case. 145 But where a constitutional decision is
criticized, findings are factual. The AJRFA Amendment, for instance, sets forth
the importance of peyote as a sacrament for Native Americans, the protections
that exist under federal and state law, the Smith decision's refusal to protect this
use under the Constitution, and the harmful effects of inadequate and spotty
141 Id. § 2000bb(a)(4). In contrast, the AIRFA Amendment finds that Sirdth "held that
the First Amendment does not protect Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian
religious ceremonies, and also raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be
protected under the compelling State interest standard." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996a(a)(4) (Supp.
1995).
142 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment). See also Justice Blackmun's dissenting complaint that the Smith majority
"effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our
Constitution." d. at 908.
14 3 Justice O'Connor wrote, "[Ciourts have been quite capable of applying our free
exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
state interests." Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). In earlier versions of RFRA, this
finding stated that "the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder is a workable test for striking sensible balances." For obscure reasons,
the reference to Sherbert and Yoder was omitted in the final draft, to be replaced by the
words "in prior Federal court rulings." See Lupu, supra note 70, at 196. However, the first
"purpose" of RFRA (§ 2000bb(bX1)), continues to refer to the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert and Yoder as the test to be restored.
145 See supra note 7.
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statutory protection. 146 In stark contrast, the RFRA findings do not specify
serious governmental intrusions upon religious liberty that can be rectified only
by a statutory creation of substantive religious rights beyond those the Court is
willing to recognize. Even though numerous examples of bad court decisions in
the post-Smith period were brought before Congress in the RFRA hearings,
Congress chose not to address any of them directly. RFRA's findings are not
about discovering facts difficult for courts to see, but rather about the efficacy
of the judicial standard of review. 147 The RFRA findings do nothing more than
trace and evaluate the judicial history of the Free Exercise Clause, particularly
during the pre-Smith era. As described by one commentator, these findings
merely "affirm the historic importance of religious freedom and the sensibility
of the compelling interest test as a way of balancing religious liberty and
competing governmental interests." 148
As such, these findings are not true legislative findings but rather "a
congressional understanding of constitutional values that differs from the
Supreme Court's." 149 RFRA's concern is not to correct a decision on its
merits, but rather to reject one interpretive technique-the categorical
approach-in favor of another-the balancing approach. RFRA's drafters
explicitly rejected the case-by-case approach in which legislative response
would focus on a "piecemeal exemptions" process because it would be time
consuming, would embroil religious groups in constant controversy, and would
miss the real evil: the narrowed reading of the Free Exercise Clause and
concomitant rejection of the balancing test.150 Thus, given the sweeping
jurisprudential and interpretive nature of the statute, the findings can serve only
to assert Congress' judgment that a different meaning of the Free Exercise
146 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996a(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1995); see also the congressional findings in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994). Those
findings, as set forth in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231-32 n.3 (1983), detailed the
individual and social costs of age discrimination, matters which confirmed the extensive
fact-findings undertaken by the Executive Branch and Congress. There are no such fact-
findings accompanying RFRA.
147 The Court has often deferred to Congress' superior fact-finding capacity to
investigate and uncover problems that courts cannot detect on a case-by-case basis.
See infra part VII.B.
148 David M. Ackerman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and The Religious
Freedom Act: A Legal Analysis 22 (Congressional Research Service, April 17, 1992).
149 Conlde, supra note 15, at 67.
150 Id. at 230. ("RFRA would solve the problem of perpetual religious conflict with
interest groups and also the problem of religious minorities too small to be heard in the
legislature."); see also Berg, supra note 5, at 12-13. C. Hamilton, supra note 126 (RFRA's
"across-the-board treatment suggests negative ramifications for Frst Amendment freedoms
that the statute-by-statute scenario does not.").
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Clause would better protect religious claimants in litigation.
But why should the Supreme Court, or any other court, be expected to
defer to these legislative expressions of displeasure with Smith's limited
conception of the Free Exercise Clause? There is certainly no indication that by
these findings Congress is expressing "a specially informed legislative
competence" 151 in order to determine what the Free Exercise Clause means or
what level of scrutiny the courts should use in evaluating religiously neutral
laws. Nor does the legislative history of RFRA provide any more legislative
substance or expertise to these findings. The committee reports of both the
Senate and the House of Representatives simply track the statutory findings by
giving fuller narrations of the differing viewpoints expressed by the Justices in
Smith, by giving more lavish legislative praise for the Court's past use of the
compelling governmental interest test, and by expressing more fulsome
legislative dislike of Smith.152
And in virtually identical language, both committees concluded that (1) the
effect of the Smith decision has been to hold laws of general applicability that
operate to burden religious practices to "the lowest level of scrutiny employed
by the courts: the 'rational relationship test,' which requires only that a law
must be rationally related to a legitimate State interest," and (2) by lowering
the level of scrutiny, Smith "has created a climate in which the free exercise of
religion is continually jeopardized." 153 As these reports and the testimony that
preceded them attest, "[t]he debate over RFRA was not about what Congress
might do to ensure religious liberty but rather about the Smith Court's implicit
overruling of prior free exercise doctrine." 154
151 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
152 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-7; HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-9.
153 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-8. Substantially identical language also appears
in the HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-6. The Senate Report adds a rather provocative
statement that "State and local legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions
from laws of general application to protect the ability of the religious minorities to practice
their faiths, an explicit fundamental constitutional right." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at
8. To that sentence is appended a quotation from West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), stating that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects [presumably including the free exercise of religion] from the
vicissitudes of political controversy and "to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials." That Barnette sentence then concludes by stating that the purpose of the Bill of
Rights was also to "establish [those subjects beyond the reach of government officials] as
legal principles to be applied by the courts." Id. Barnette is certainly no authority for the
proposition that Congress can establish such legal principles "to be applied by the courts."
154 Hamilton, supra note 126, at 385.
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C. The RFRA Restoration "Purpose"
In light of the foregoing "findings," RFRA states that Congress has two
"purposes" in mind:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government. 155
The first of these statutory "purposes" accurately reflects the congressional
conception of what RFRA is designed to accomplish. Again, the Senate and the
House reports use virtually identical language to explain the restorative purpose
of RFRA. The Senate report, for example, states that RFRA "is intended to
restore the compelling interest test previously applicable to free exercise cases
by requiring that government actions that substantially burden the exercise of
religion be demonstrated to be the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest." 156 The purpose, then, is to restore judicial
balancing as constitutional doctrine.
And which branch of government is to implement that restoration of the
compelling interest test? Both the Senate and the House Reports make clear that
it is the job of the courts to do so. It is the "expectation" of both the Senate and
House committees, say the respective reports, that "the courts will look to free
exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether the
exercise of religion has been substantially burdened and the least restrictive
means have been employed in furthering a compelling governmental
interest. 157
RFRA makes that "expectation" even more precise by specifying, by way
of a statutory "purpose," that the courts should act to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in two pre-Smith judicial precedents, the Sherbert and
the Yoder decisions. 158 In that restorative process, of course, the courts are also
155 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1993).
156 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. Substantially identical language appears in the
HOUsE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.15 7 The actual quotation is from the SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9. Virtually
identical language appears in the HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7.
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The two cases cited in this section are
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. See Berg, supra note 5, for a discussion urging courts interpreting RFRA to replicate the
"high-water mark" of free exercise protection as exemplified by these cases.
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expected to forget and ignore the Smith decision and any stare decisis qualifies
it may have.159 By implication, courts are also expected to ignore Go/dman v.
Weinberger160 and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.1 61 These cases rejected the
compelling interest test for free exercise cases in the military and prison
contexts, respectively. 162 In sum, Congress is saying to the judiciary: (1)
replace Smith's categorical reading of the Free Exercise Clause with the pre-
Smith balancing approach with respect to religiously neutral laws; (2) restore
and use the pre-Smith balancing approach as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder
and ignore other pre-Smith decisions that, through definitional balancing, failed
to protect religious exercise; and (3) disregard if not overrule the Smith,
Go/dman, and OZone decisions.
Finally, RFRA provides its own version of the compelling interest test.
This test echoes varied ad hoc balancing formulations set forth in Sherbert,
Yoder, and elsewhere. 163 Labelling the test as an "exception" to RFRA's
"general" restatement of the Free Exercise Clause, Section l(b) provides:
Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
159 See Michael Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 249, 284 (1995) for the argument that RFRA wipes out not only
the narrow reading of Smith that leaves religiously neutral laws outside the Free Exercise
Clause but also those applications of the compelling interest test that are watered-down
versions of strict scrutiny (what we have referred to as the "definitional" balances, supra
part IV.B.).
160 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
161 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
162 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
163 The Supreme Court never employed a single formulation of the balancing test
neatly and consistently. See supra part IV. The language here is an approximation of the
strict scrutiny test, perhaps closest to that articulated in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); nevertheless, the main elements of the balance were introduced in Sherbert and
have appeared in most of the cases.
In addition to setting up a tension between the statutory statement of the balancing test
and the way it appears in precedent, RFRA contains an internal tension. The reference to
Sherbert and Yoder in the "Purposes" section is inconsistent with the reference to "prior
federal court rulings" in the "Findings" section, since the former exemplify ad hoc
balancing and the latter contain definitional balancing. See supra part V.B.; see also Lupu,
supra note 70, at 196-98; Lupu, Statutes Revolving, supra note 116. In any event, while
RFRA is obviously not a "restoration" of the case law as applied on the eve of Smith, it is a
restoration of the interpretive methodology (and, inexorably, the constitutional doctrine) of
the Sherbert-Yoder-Thomas regime.
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restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 1 6 4
Whatever ambiguities may adhere to this statutory definition of the
compelling interest test, the fact remains that the test itself is solely a creature
of the judicial function of reading and interpreting constitutional provisions.
Does Congress have the right to dictate the interpretive technique-indeed the
constitutional doctrine-by which the Supreme Court acts as the supreme "case
or controversy" arbiter of the Free Exercise Clause?
It is well settled that Congress cannot tell the Court how to interpret the
Constitution, as this would be "an obvious intrusion on [judicial] authority." 165
Yet, RFRA is described as "a quasi-constitutional statute" 166 and as "a statute
designed to perform a constitutional function[,J . . . designed to restore the
rights that previously existed under the Free Exercise Clause, rights that
Congress believes should exist if the Constion were properly
interpreted."167 How can these two positions be reconciled? Proponents
explained that RFRA "is not trying to overturn the Court's ruling as a matter
of constitutional law .... Instead, Congress is using its powers to create a
statutory right where the Court refused to declare a constitutional one." 168
The new substantive rights under the statute, so the argument goes,
supplement the "floor" of constitutional protection; they do not replace it. The
constitutional doctrine of free exercise is frozen at Smith and Hialeah.169 The
body of law that will develop around RFRA's termis-"substantial burden,"
"compelling governmental interest," and "least restrictive alternative-will be
statutory, not constitutional, interpretation. 170 An all-important question, then,
164 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1993). For discussion of this section on
the least restrictive alternative, see Idleman, supra note 116, at 280-82; Lupu, supra note
70, at 194-95.
165 Berg, supra note 5, at 63.
166 Laycock, supra note 116, at 254.
167 Layeock & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219 (emphasis added).
168 Berg, supra note 5, at 63; see also Laycock, supra note 116, at 246, 251-53.
169 This argument makes it possible to defend a new, abstracted statement of the
balancing test without stare decisis concerns.
170The Senate Report adopts the assertion that Congress seeks not to affect
constitutional interpretation. It states:
While the act is intended to enforce the right guaranteed by the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, it does not purport to legislate the standard of review to be
applied by the Federal courts in cases brought under that constitutional provision.
Instead, it creates a new statutory prohibition on governmental action that substantially
burdens the free exercise of religion, except where such action is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
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is whether RFRA indeed creates such a supplementary statutory or "quasi-
constitutional" right.
D. The RFRA "Claim or Defense" Purpose
Critical to maintaining this distinction between RFRA and the Free
Exercise Clause is the argument that RFRA does establish an independent,
substantive statutory right of action. Congress was satisfied that it had created
such a right when it stated RFRA's second "purpose" was to provide "a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government." 171 In Section 1(c), this "claim or defense" reference is enlarged
by providing:
Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim
or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing
under article IM of the Constitution. 172
A burden "in violation of this section" refers to sections l(a) and (b),
which provide that government shall not substantially burden religious
exercise, even by general laws, unless it has a compelling interest and no less
restrictive alternative. 173 Under section 1(c), then, a person can assert a claim
or defense that some religious exercise has been burdened in the absence of a
compelling interest. RFRA further makes plain that the only kind of religious
exercise to which the claim or defense relates is an "exercise of religion under
the First Amendment to the Constitution," presumably as recognized by the
Supreme Court. 174
Taken together, these provisions are said to show RFRA to be "a
replacement for the Free Exercise Clause... as universal as the Free Exercise
Clause." 175 Instead of bringing a constitutional action under the Free Exercise
Clause, one should bring a claim under RFRA. Under section 1(c), the
balancing approach is to be implemented by courts in the course of ordinary
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14 n.43.
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2) (Supp. V. 1993).
172 Id. § 2000bb-l(c).
173 Id. § 2000bb-l(a), (b).
174 Id. § 2000bb-2(4). In Srmth, the Supreme Court assumed that peyote ingestion was
an exercise of the respondents' religion, although refusing to decide if such an exercise was
"central" to their religion. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
175 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219.
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"judicial proceedings" brought to challenge or enforce some religiously neutral
law or rule. Congress expects that any federal or state court, confronted with a
free exercise claim properly raised in any kind of judicial proceeding, 176 will
apply the RFRA restatement of strict scrutiny (and not the Free Exercise
Clause) and "will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for
guidance" in following that test. 77 In this way, RFRA purports to "enacto- a
statutory version of the Free Exercise Clause." 178
Do these provisions demonstrate that Congress has successfully created
in RFRA an independent, substantive right that is enforceable by statute?
Or does RFRA modify a Free Exercise Clause analysis by changing the
applicable constitutional doctrine? Admittedly, this is a strange inquiry.
The "claim or defense" provison certainly meets the formal requirements
of stating a "right of action." 179 But such language by itself does not a
substantive statute make. Is this claim or defense attached to a substantive
right? What is the nature of the right conferred by RFRA? Read against the
backdrop of the Findings and Purposes sections, which repeatedly criticize
the Court's interpretive methodology, the "right of action" is open to
question.
During congressional debates, proponents repeatedly stated that RFRA
is directed solely toward re-establishing the pre-Smith compelling interest
test as the standard of review for use by the courts in addressing free
exercise claims in light of neutral and generally applicable laws. Senator
176 See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERMERG & C. KfrH WiNGATE, FEDERAL COURTS,
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF PowERs 12 (Supp. 1994) ("[A]ithough the statute purports
to create a claim, it does not clearly indicate where litigants can pursue such claims. By any
measure, claims under the statute qualify as federal questions for jurisdictional purposes;
perhaps that is why Congress felt that no jurisdictional provision was appropriate.").
177 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9. A somewhat similar hope or
expectation that state courts would not follow the most recent Supreme Court precedents
was expressed by proponents of legislation that would have stripped the Supreme Court and
all other federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving voluntary school prayers. See
Charles E. Rice, Limiting Federal Court Juridiction " The Constitutional Basis for the
Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 197 (1981); see also Eugene Gressman
& Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 495, 505-07 (1983).
178 Laycock, supra note 116, at 235.
179 q. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988
& Supp V. 1993). "Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to
create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights." Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). This Act was later
amended to provide a clear statutory right of action to protect ritual use of peyote, see
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Kennedy noted during the Senate debate, "[t]he act creates no new rights
for any religious practice or for any potential litigant."180 And Senator
Lieberman added, "RFRA does not create a new legal standard."18 1 The
remarks of Senator Bradley on the floor of the Senate are typical of many
others:
RFRA bolsters the free exercise of religion by restoring the legal
standard that was applied to the decisions which preceded Smith, the
compelling interest standard. RFRA simply insures that courts will protect
the fundamental right to freely exercise one's religion at an appropriate
level of scrutiny. RFRA does not dictate the outcome of any particular
case; rather, it allows each case to be judged on the merits within the
proper framework. 182
Taking these statements at face value, RFRA creates no new
substantive religious rights, privileges or entitlements. Nor does it add to
or supplement any such rights. There is plainly no new or different kind of
exercise recognized by RFRA to which a claim or defense might be made.
A substantive right-an exemption, for instance-might result from the
balancing done by a court in a given case brought under RFRA. The
"claim or defense" provision, coupled with the balancing test, then
becomes the mechanism by which Congress induces courts to create
substantive constitutional rights; but no pre-existing rights are thereby
enforced.183 Such pressure on courts to produce new rights is an anomaly.
One proponent has explained that the statute is "an across-the-board
right to argue for religious exemptions and make the government carry the
burden of proof when it claims that it cannot afford to grant
exemptions." 184 But with this formulation, no "right" is established;
neither is any governmental behavior limited or prohibited. When Congress
creates substantive rights by way of exemption, it is determining that
government possesses no reason good enough to enforce the law against
religious conduct. But RFRA does not involve Congress in evaluating
governmental interests. The "across the board right to argue for
180 139 CONG. REc. S14351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
181 139 CONG. REC. S14462 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
182 Id. at S14469.
183 This confusion is evident in the case law developing under RFRA. Compare
Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 850 (Vt. 1994) (RFRA overrules Smith) and Phipps v.
Parker, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3869 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (RFRA overrules OLone) with
Bessard v. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (E.D. Cal.
1994) (clear distinction between RFRA as statute and Smith as constitutional law).184 Laycock, supra note 116, at 230.
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exemptions" makes no claim that particular government action should not
interfere with religious exercise; only that whatever the interest, it must be
found by a court to be sufficiently compelling to override the free exercise
claim. By extending the balancing approach to neutral, generally applicable
laws, RFRA is not evaluating government interests. It is only redefining
the meaning of "free exercise" as construed by the Court. 185
RFRA creates a "claim or defense" that the RFRA version of the Free
Exercise Clause has been violated; however, it creates no newly-minted
RFRA right of action or judicial proceeding. Nor is there a functional
equivalent of such a right of action. A RFRA violation is simply a statutory
mechanism for conveying to the courts the expectation of Congress that the
courts will ignore the Smith precedent and will use the compelling
governmental interest test when confronted with a free exercise claim
raised in some non-RFRA kind of judicial proceeding.
The statute confers the right to have one's free exercise claim
adjudicated under a balancing approach-that is, the right to have a court
employ a particular interpretive method. It is the right to have a strict
scrutiny standard of review employed in free exercise cases. But this is no
more than the "right" to have courts employ Congress' own reading of the
Free Exercise Clause. A standard of review is subordinate to the
recognition of a right. It cannot itself constitute the right. In a suit brought
under RFRA, one does not simply assert a claim or defense that some
religious exercise has been burdened in the absence of a compelling
interest. In essence, one asserts a claim or defense that the Free Exercise
Clause, as Congress interprets it, has been violated. Thus, RFRA is, as one
commentator has noted, "a bare standard of review yoked to no particular
policy arena within which Congress is constitutionally empowered to
act." 186 This absence of linkage to any independently created right is
185 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 456 (1994):
Congress made no effort to tailor a solution to the demands of any
demonstrated imposition on religious activity; indeed, Congress did not even try
to identi any specific instance of mistreatment that RFRA would remedy. To the
extent that Congress made any judgment at all, it was an interpretive, doctrinal
judgment about the jurisprudential merits of pre-Smith Supreme Court precedent,
not about burdens facing religious believers.
For a discussion of how Congress can evaluate government interests, see Jesse H.
Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms
of the Ovil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299, 304 (1982).
186 Hamilton, supra note 126, at 364 (arguing that no enumerated power
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nowhere more evident than in the RFRA attempt to mask the restoration of
the balancing approach as a "claim or defense" that RFRA has been
violated.
Congress' instruction to courts on the standard of review in free
exercise cases is tantamount to telling the judiciary how to interpret the
Clause, for the balancing approach in the free exercise area operates as the
constitutional doctrine. 187 Under Sherbert, the constitutional meaning of
free exercise was that no one shall be burdened in their free exercise-even
by generally applicable, facially neutral laws-without a compelling
interest. That was the substantive constitutional law, and remained so until
Smith. To have a court apply strict scrutiny is not a right in itself that can
be separated out from constitutional meaning. RFRA is completely emptied
of substance as an independent statute precisely because it is filled with
substantive constitutional doctrine.
During the RFRA hearings, the balancing test was often treated as a
"mere" standard of review or burden of proof attached to a statute to give
guidance to courts, rather than the very heart of the constitutional doctrine. In a
colloquy between ACLU President Nadine Strossen and Congressman
Washington, Ms. Strossen described the compelling governmental interest as
simply "a heavy burden of proof." 188
Mr. Washington: And when you take that standard [strict scrutiny judicial
review] and you take the evening gown off the standard that is floating around
and in metaphysical constitutional terms is called compelling State interest it
amounts to nothing more than a burden of proof.
Ms. Strossen: Exactly.
Mr. Washington: And it is a higher burden of proof than the Supreme
Court in its wisdom, or for the lack of it, has found to use in certain cases
involving religion. Right?
Ms. Strossen: Exactly.
Mr. Washington: ... And the only question is that... on the standard of
review and whether the Congress has the authority to establish a burden of
proof or standard of review, we do that routinely in almost every piece of
legislation that is passed. We contemplate what is likely to be the tugs and
authorized Congress to pass RFRA).
187 See supra part IV.A.
188 House Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 103.
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balances and pulls and pushes on judicial interpretation and we direct the
Court's attention, and rightfully so, to how we wish to have it interpreted.
There are standard rules of statutory construction. There are rules that apply
when the Constitution meets a statutory construction. And it is not only the
right but the duty of Congress to give guidance to the Court in that respect.
Would you not agree?
Ms. Strossen: I completely agree, especially in light of the fact that all of
you take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it is particularly
important that you do so in a situation such as this when that is precisely what
the Supreme Court, with all due respect, has failed to do. 189
Of course Congress has legislative power to set standards of review1 90 and
to allocate burdens of proof with respect to statutory schemes of its own
creation.' 9 ' Congress can even direct the interpretation of the statute's
provisions. 192 But the power to set these and other controls on the judiciary 193
189 Id. at 105-06. While hearing colloquy is not very high in the hierarchy of
legislative history sources (ranking lower than committee reports, sponsor statements and
rejected proposals), OTTO I. HETzEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 444 (2d ed. 1993), this colloquy nonetheless illustrates the attempt to
characterize RFRA as a routine setting of a burden of proof.
190 This usage of "standards of review" refers to the review by a court over a prior
tribunal's (or agency's) decision. A completely different usage of the term is intended when
"courts perform their Marbwy v. Madison function of checking a legislative choice for its
permissibility under the Constitution (i.e., constitutional review by the courts in general
over legislative-like action)... [where] standards of review [are used] to test the
substantive decision[s]." 1 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL
STANDARDS OF REviEw §1.03 at 1-27-1-28 (1992). "Standards of review" as commonly
used in statutes, such as the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1994)
refer to the "roles and functions between courts (or between courts and agencies) rather
than that special application of court review over legislation or other political action that is
questioned constitutionally." Id. at 1-28-1-29; see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (a reviewing court can void agency actions, findings and
conclusions that do not meet the standards of review set out in the Administrative
Procedures Act).
191 The Supreme Court has generally deferred to Congress' legislative allocation of
burdens of proof and setting of standards of proof. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EvIDENCE 1046 (7th ed. 1983). Where Congress has spoken, the court has
deferred to the traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and standards
of proof in the federal courts, absent countervailing constitutional restraints. See Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980). For the distinction between standards of proof,
appellate standards of review, and constitutional standards of review, see CHILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 190, at 1-25-1-27.
192 For a discussion of statutory directions for the courts, see 1A NORMAN J.
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presupposes an independent, substantive statute, the interpretation and
implementation of which is being directed. RFRA's standard of review or
burden of proof serves no statutory scheme or right of action for enforcing new
or additional free exercise rights. Congress cannot engage in these tasks when
it is engaged in independent constituional interpretation. Congressman
Washington and Ms. Strossen confuse the everyday lawmaking activities with
extraordinary measures to correct the Supreme Court's failure to "uphold and
defend" the Constitution. They ignore the fact that RFRA's "standard of
review" or "burden of proof"-which government must meet-is actually a
judge-made test developed in the context of defining constitutional text and is
itself determinative of constitutional doctrine.
Thus, RFRA is not a free-standing statute. It has no substance. It
creates no new statutory free exercise rights. It gives rise to no new
statutory right of action, replete with its own standard of review. The
"claim or defense" that RFRA purports to create relates to nothing more
than RFRA's rewrite of the Free Exercise Clause. It is but the vehicle by
which Congress seeks to ride into the judicial reservation. Having arrived
there, RFRA attaches itself to what may often be a totally independent
judicial proceeding, wherein a party making a free exercise claim or
defense foreswears any reliance on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and relies exclusively on RFRA. The statute thereupon directs
the court to follow what Congress believes is a better way of reading and
applying the Free Exercise Clause.
E. RFRA: A Super-Statute
RFRA is truly awesome in its statutory sweep. 194 There is no federal, state
or local governmental unit that escapes its reach. There is no federal, state or
local law or rule that is exempt from the RFRA standard of review. There is no
federal or state court, whether it be a trial or appellate court, that is free to
follow the Smith version of the Free Exercise Clause or to ignore the
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 27.01 (5th ed. 1992); HETZEL,
supra note 189.193 Congress undoubtedly has the power to direct courts on statutory interpretation in
general and to nullify the effects of Supreme Court cases that interpret statutes in ways
Congress does not condone. See supra note 7. Congress also establishes and facilitates the
workings of the federal court system through Title 28 of the United States Code.
194 Professor Paulsen refers to it as a "sweeping 'super-statute' cutting across all other
federal statutes" and uses the metaphor of a river cutting deeply through all the law; hence
the play on words for the title of his article, A RFRA Runs Through It. Paulsen, supra note
159.
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compelling governmental interest test where a neutral, generally applicable law
is challenged under RFRA. Even the Supreme Court of the United States is
expected to shape up, to restore the pre-Smith reading of the Clause, and
(hopefully) to overrule Smith.
The RFRA proposition that government shall not substantially burden
religious exercise, unless it proves a compelling governmental interest, is given
life by the broadest possible definition of "government." Section (2)(1) states
that the term "government" includes "a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State." 195 RFRA's legislative
history also makes clear that prison and military units of government are
included within the reach of this statute, which nullifies the effect of Goldman
v. Weinberger and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.196 Congress debated and
defeated an amendment that would have exempted prisoners from RFRA's
protection, and to date courts have heard dozens of RFRA cases brought by
prisoners. 197
In a provision unparalleled in American statutory history, Section (3)(a)
declares that RFRA "applies to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after November 16, 1993." 198 Thus, in one fell swoop,
RFRA attaches itself to every statute, law, ordinance, and rule in the land, as
well as those that may be enacted in the future. And insofar as federal statutes
are concerned, RFRA purports to incorporate its standard of review of
religious exercise claims into every law appearing in the United States Code.199
In effect, Congress here intends to amend every federal statute wherein a
religious exercise claim might conceivably be made. As for future legislation,
Congress must specifically exclude RFRA application; otherwise, RFRA will
195 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (Supp. V 1993).
196 SENATE REORT, supra note 4, at 9-15; HoUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
197 The prison amendment was rejected in part because Congress believed courts
would find the government's interest in prison security and order to be compelling. See
Whitbeck, supra note 5, at 858-62; Berg, supra note 5, at 68-69. On developing case law,
see Lupu, supra note 70, at 203-05.
198 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V 1993). Section 3(b) goes on to provide that
"Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993 is subject to this chapter unless
such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter." Id. § 2000bb-
3(b) (Supp. V 1993).
199 "Rather than putting a guarantee of religious freedom in every statute, Congress
dealt with the issue universally ahead of time." Berg, supra note 5, at 62. But see Hamilton,
supra note 126, at 366 for the problems that this super-statute characteristic of RFRA
creates under the enumerated powers doctrine.
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apply automatically.200
To complete the broad spectrum of coverage, Section l(c) provides that
any person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of RFRA
"may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief against a government." 201 Given the fact that most
religious exercise complaints arise out of burdens imposed by state laws,
Section l(c) obviously includes judicial proceedings in state courts. And such
state law complaints, as well as complaints involving federal laws, clearly can
and do arise in federal judicial proceedings. Since state and federal judicial
proceedings do not necessarily end with the state or lower federal court rulings,
the judicial proceedings mentioned in Section 1(c) must include proceedings
before the Supreme Court of the United States. To all these courts, RFRA
says: Ignore the Smith ruling, and apply the pre-Smith standard of review
where substantial burdens on religious exercise might result from rules of
general applicability.202 Congress' message is loud and clear:203 The Supreme
Court "should not misconstrue the Constitution."204
F. The RFRA Difference: Comparison with Other Statutes
Congress may protect, by statute, constitutional values over and above
the Supreme Court's "floor." 205 Proponents of RFRA argue that the statute
is analogous to existing statutes that function in this way, particularly the
Voting Rights Act (VRA). In a similar vein, Professor Laycock has argued
that
[t]he structure of RFRA is entirely parallel to the structure of the
Voting Rights Acts. In each context, the Supreme Court requires plaintiffs
to prove facial discrimination or actual discriminatory motive to show a
constitutional violation. And in each context, Congress created a statutory
200 p. 1 U.S.C. § 1, the so-called Dictionary Act, which defines certain common
words used in statutes for purposes of "determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise." 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1995).
201 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (Supp. V 1993).
202 Any further development of the Smith doctrine is blocked. All other
inconsistent free exercise doctrines developed by the Court's reading of the Clause are
rendered irrelevant. RFRA, having forced its way into the judicial system, simply
superimposes its statutory dictates regarding the standard of review courts should use
in treating free exercise claims.203 See generally Conkle, spra note 15.
204 Statement of Senator Hatch, 139 CONG. REc. S14367 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993);
see also the congressional critiques of Smith, supra note 4.
205 Laycock, supra note 116, at 246.
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right in which plaintiffs show a significant burden on their voting rights,
but no bad motive and no facial discrimination, and this shifts the burden
of justification back to the government. If Congress has power to dispense
with proof of bad motive or facial discrimination in voting cases, I think it
has power to do so in religion cases. 206
It follows from this argument that because intentional discrimination is
required in the voting rights and free exercise contexts, the VRA and
RFRA are legitimate statutory responses that protect people from
unintentional burdens. But this "analogy" works only at a very high level
of generality. A closer look at the VRA reveals that it has little in common
with RFRA, in purpose, function, structure, or concept.
RFRA imposes an obligation on the judiciary to disregard a mode
announced by the Supreme Court for interpreting and applying a
constitutional provision and to replace it with what Congress thinks is a
"better" interpretive methodology. The VRA does no such thing. Its
purpose and function are not the restatement of a constitutional provision.
It dictates no substantive constitutional doctrine. It does not impose a
standard of review for voting rights claims. Because it is enacted pursuant
to the "enforcement" provision of the Fifteenth Amendment, it seeks to
enforce the guarantee of the constitutional right to vote and in so doing
repeats some of the language of that amendment as it defines the statutory
right to vote regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 20 7 But it does not purport to substitute a different interpretive
approach for Fifteenth Amendment cases. In fact, the proscription against
discriminatory effects is geared toward eliminating intentional
discrimination so deeply embedded and so well masked in social and
political practices that it cannot be "proven" and remedied in the context of
normal constitutional adjudication.
In the free exercise area, there is no comparable linkage between
intentional discrimination and resulting discrimination. Typically, a burden
on religious conduct that results from a neutral, generally applicable law is
attributable merely to the enforcement of that law, and not to efforts to
destroy or suppress some religious practice via general legislation. We
certainly have historical instances of this, 20 8 but in the modem regulatory
state most burdens are truly "inadvertent."
The VRA is an enormous and complex statute. Its scope and detail
206 Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145,
153 (1995).
207 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).
208 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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address the persistent problem of states that continue to permit and
encourage racial discrimination in all aspects of voting. Its massive
statutory scheme sets forth a myriad of enforcement procedures to address
the myriad tools regularly used by states to impede voting by African-
Americans. Specific governmental practices are controlled or prohibited,
such as literacy tests, character proof, poll taxes, vote dilution schemes,
residence requirements and the like. Specific protection for participation in
the nomination and election process, as well as for minority languages, is
recognized. Investigations of voting registration procedures are authorized.
Procedures by which the Attorney General can bring suit are established.
The role of the judiciary is specified.
In contrast, RFRA remains brief and general. Unlike the VRA, it does
not seek to correct, contain or proscribe any identifiable governmental
practices. It does not ensure that the Laotian Hmong can bury their dead
without the disturbance of an autopsy, or that Native Americans can
partake of their sacraments. The hearings were chock-full of examples of
burdensome effects of generally applicable laws on religious practice, but
RFRA does not set out to protect any specific religious exercise. It intends
to protect all religious exercise that is burdened by an insufficiently
important governmental interest. But it does so in a way that is no more
than instruction on the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The VRA
shares nothing with this concept of "expanding" rights.
Of course, like RFRA, the VRA depends on courts to develop a body
of law after the basic structure of decisionmaking is set by Congress. 209
But comprehensive statutory schemes like the VRA cannot be "at war with
the essence of the Court's constitutional judgment." 210 RFRA-on its
face-contradicts the very interpretation of what it means to protect free
exercise of religion.
The VRA establishes a clear statutory right, and then sets out
provisions to enforce that right. Sections 1971 and 1972 define the
contours of the right. Then § 1973 provides for enforcement of that right.
Here, the VRA enables the statutory right to vote to be enforced as long as
the "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure [is] imposed or applied ... in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right... to vote."211 Thus, we have
appropriate action of Congress: the creation of an independent statutory
right, the establishment of enforcement provisions, and the setting of
specific limitations on government. Congress has clearly defined situations
209 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 185, at 442.
2 10 Id. at 443; see also Hamilton, supra note 126, at 365.
211 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (emphasis added).
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which impair the right to vote and has set out substantive remedial
measures to address them.
It has also been suggested that RFRA is similar to other statutes, such
as Title VII, because they are closely related to constitutional values. But
Title VII is easily distinguished from RFRA. Title VII expands the public
antidiscrimination principle to include certain forms of private conduct, and
it "extends, rather than duplicates, the coverage of constitutionally-based
judicial doctrine. It accordingly serves a legitimate congressional purpose
by bringing a circumscribed political problem (discrimination against
religion in the workplace) within the ambit of judicial supervision." 212
RFRA, however, seeks to replace the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause with its own interpretation.
Some have even suggested similarities between RFRA and statutes like
§§ 1983 and 1988 which are intended to provide individuals with a right of
action against state governments to enforce liberties under the Bill of
Rights. 213 But RFRA is easily distinguished from these statutes as well.
Such statutes are not themselves the source of substantive rights; they give
"a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred," 214 that is,
judicially determined. No religious rights "elsewhere conferred" are being
enforced by RFRA. 215
212 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 185, at 460.
213 See Laycock, supra note 116, at 246.
214 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
215 While "vehicle remediation statutes" like §§ 1983 and 1988 enforce liberties,
the meaning of these liberties "is that as determined by the courts, not by Congress.
RFRA, in contrast, not only authorizes suits in the name of religious liberty, but also
defines the substance of free exercise above and beyond the substantive parameters
recognized by the Supreme Court. Indeed, RFRA embodies an interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause that was specifically rejected by the Court in Smith and certain
prior cases. In short, because substantive congressional alteration is not the purpose or
effect of these remedial enforcement statutes, it is simply mistaken to argue that they
somehow establish the constitutionality of RFRA." Idleman, supra note 116, at 306-
07.
Professor Laycock argues that there is "a constitutional violation to be remedied
by RFRA. RFRA would enforce the constitutional rule against laws prohibiting the
free exercise of religion. Congress can act on the premise that the exercise of religion
includes religiously motivated conduct. Even the Supreme Court recognizes that
much." Laycock, supra note 116, at 251. However, the definition of an exercise of
religion is not at issue; at issue is the definition of what is included within the term
"laws." The Court has a fundamentally contrary understanding of what comes within
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. So, RFRA remedies no constitutional violation
because, under Smith, general laws do not come within the Clause's reach.
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G. RFRA: A Troubling Prototype
RFRA is a congressional requirement that courts interpret a
constitutional provision according to what Congress deems to be a
preferable judicial standard of review. The implications of this requirement
are staggering. Can Congress revise the First Amendment? Can it revise
the entire Bill of Rights? Can Congress revise any other provision of the
Constitution that has typically been given a limited meaning by the
judiciary in a case or controversy?
Senator Jesse Helms, a sponsor of numerous congressional bills
designed to reign in the Court's constitutional interpretations, once
remarked that "[t]here is more than one way to skin a cat, and there is
more than one way for Congress to provide a check on arrogant Supreme
Court Justices who routinely distort the Constitution to suit their own
notions of public policy." 216 RFRA is a new and so far successful way of
"skinning the Supreme Court cat." All these techniques, including RFRA,
target a particular Court decision, like Smith, and then denounce that
decision in most vituperative language. But the RFRA method of aborting a
distasteful Court decision, through a direct incursion into the judicial
branch, is the most innovative way of "skinning" that Congress has yet
devised. For that reason, RFRA sets a dangerous prototype for future
congressional fits of displeasure with Supreme Court rulings by giving
impetus to future enactments of RFRA-type super-statutes.
The RFRA prototype, for example, might be useful to a future
Congress concerned with ratcheting upward some of the constitutionally
based equal protection rights of commercial business interests. The
offending target, to be denounced along with fond echoes of the Lochner
era, might be the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc.,217 which held that business interests are not a
216 130 CoNG. REc. S2901 (March 20, 1984). Senator Helms' preferred device
has been to use the Exceptions Clause of Article III to propose statutes that would strip
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over cases that involve the same subject
matter (such as abortion rights or voluntary school prayer) as to which the Court has
rendered controversial or unpopular decisions. Usually this device would also strip the
lower federal courts of original subject-matter jurisdiction over such cases. See
Gressman & Gressman, supra note 177.
217 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993). The Court there stated that, in areas of social and
economic policy, "a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification." Id. at 2101. And the legislative choice, said the
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suspect class for equal protection purposes and that economic regulations
will be sustained if there is any conceivable rational basis for the
classification.
Borrowing from RFRA, Congress could enact a Fundamental
Economic Rights Restoration Act (FERRA), designed to undo the Court's
"distorted" reading in Beach of the constitutional doctrine of equal
protection. FERRA would begin by making its own statutory restatement
of the equal protection concept, whereby (1) commercial rights to contract
and to conduct a lawful business are elevated to suspect classifications, and
(2) strict scrutiny is to be applied to any economic law or regulation that
substantially burdens those fundamental commercial rights.
Following the RFRA path still further, FERRA could then create a
statutory "claim or defense" that a federal or state governmental action
violates not the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, but the
equal protection concepts statutorily embodied and reframed in FERRA.
Such a "claim or defense" could be raised in any federal or state court
proceeding. And to complete its congruence with RFRA, FERRA would
declare that it applies "to all federal and state law, and the implementation
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or
after the enactment of this Act." In this way FERRA would then be like
RFRA, constituting a silent amendment to every law and provision in the
United States Code, every state law and regulation, and every city
ordinance that affects business interests.
The FERRA example can be multiplied in many areas of the law. If
RFRA is constitutional, there would appear to be few if any limits to
Congress' ability to direct an interpretation of a provision of the
Constitution to which the Supreme Court has given a more limiting
interpretation, at least in the areas of individual rights embodied in the
First and Fourteenth Amendments by purporting to create a statutory right
of action.
Thus one can imagine other RFRA-like statutes that would (1) ratchet
obscenity and pornography up to the status of free speech, which the Court
has refused to do,218 (2) ratchet up the personal interest in reputation to the
level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 219 (3) ratchet up the
right to an education to the status of a constitutionally protected right,
Court, "may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data." Id. at 2102. The Court also made clear that this rational basis kind of review
was applicable both to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and to
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2101.
218 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
219 C. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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subject to strict scrutiny,220 (4) ratchet up gender and sexual orientation to
the highest levels of scrutiny,221 (5) define and ratchet up additional
unenumerated privacy rights as yet unrecognized by the Court, or (6)
restore and ratchet up those privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States that were destroyed by the Slaughterhouse Cases.222 In short,
the RFRA model can be used by Congress to reform, destroy or restore a
wide variety of the Court's constitutional interpretations, thus putting
Congress into the heart of the judicial function. 223
VII. RFRA AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The foregoing account of RFRA's provisions illuminates the constitutional
defect of the statute. 224 On its face and by its proclaimed purpose, RFRA
220 Cf. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
221 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
222 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
223 Congress has already attempted to do what it did in RFRA in the area of
abortion rights. The proposed Freedom of Choice Act was intended to limit the states'
ability to restrict abortions as provided under the strict scrutiny test of Roe v. Wade.
See Lupu, Statutes Revolving,, supra note 116.
224 Many courts have raised (without deciding) the issue of whether or not RFRA
is constitutional: Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Whether RFRA
is constitutional has not yet been decided, and that question is not before this court.");
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Questions have been
raised about the constitutionality of the RFRA. . . . These questions are muddled
considerably in this case . . . It may be, under these circumstances [a RFRA
challenge to another federal statute passed by the same Congress], that the RFRA can
be viewed as simply having the effect of a contemporaneously enacted rule of
construction."); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The
constitutionality of this legislation-surely not before us-raises a number of questions
involving the extent of Congress' powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Loden v. Peters, 1995 WL 89951 *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1995) (noting
Canedy decision); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 228 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(noting issue not raised but describing Congress' Section 5 authority); Rust v. Clarke,
883 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 n.12 (D. Neb. 1995) (noting issue not raised); Hsu v. Roslyn
Union Free Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 445, 461 n.20 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting issue not
raised); Newman v. Midway Southern Baptist Church, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 836 (U.S.
Bankr. Ct. D. Kan. April 20, 1995); Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v.
City of Philadelphia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163, at *6 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26,
1994) (noting issue not raised); Allah v. Beyer, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14340, at *16
n.1 (D.N.J. March 29, 1994) ("[Tihe constitutionality of Congress' attempt to dictate
to the Supreme Court that it must reject its current interpretation of the First
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violates the separation of powers doctrine, the most fundamental element of our
constitutional system of checks and balances. 225 Congress has stepped over the
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause in favor of a prior interpretation is
questionable.... ."); Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(noting issue not raised); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 8, *21 n.12 (Colo.
Jan 16, 1996) ("The constitutionality of RFRA is being tested in the federal courts, but
has not yet been addressed by the United States Supreme Court."); Porth v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(concurring opinion of Judge Murphy questioning Congress' authority "to legislate the
standard of judicial review applicable to a free exercise of religion claim."); Hunt v.
Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 850 n.4 (Vt. 1994) ("[T]hough a federal law guides our analysis,
because the Act defines the meaning of the federal constitution, our resolution of this
case rests on a constitutional as well as statutory basis. We express no opinion as the
constitutionality of the Act.").
In other cases, the issue of RFRA's constitutionality was raised but not reached by
the court: Cochran v. Morris, 1996 WL 29324 at *10 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996);
Hamilton v. Schriro, 1996 WL 11119 at *4 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1996); Bass v. Grottoli,
1995 WL 565979 at *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995); Muhammed v. City of New
York, 904 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F.
Supp. 1444, 1450 n.12 (D. Utah 1995); Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp. 398, 403
(E.D. Wis. 1995); Van Dyke v. Washington, 896 F. Supp. 183, 189 (C.D. Ill. 1995);
George v. Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Thiry v. Carlson, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8030 (D. Kan. May 5, 1995); Abdul-Akbar v. Department of
Corrections, 1995 WL 757937 at *19 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1995) (assuming, without
deciding, constitutionality); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (D.
Wyo. 1995) (assuming, without deciding, constitutionality); Campos v. Coughlin, 854
F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
A RFRA constitutionality challenge was withdrawn in several cases: Alameen v.
Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568,
571 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
225 One federal circuit court of appeals and several federal district courts have
upheld RFRA as being an appropriate exercise by Congress of its Section 5 power to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Flores v. City of Boerne, 1996
WI. 23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Haw.
1995); Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995);
see also Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Haw. 1995); State v. Miller, 1995
Wis. App. LEXIS 945 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (agreeing with analysis in Belgard and
Sasnet); see also United States v. Bauer, 1996 WL 42240 at *7-*8 (9th Cir.) (no
discussion of constitutionality but comparison of RFRA to other statutes that validly
give protection beyond constitutional minimums).
A separation of powers violation has been discussed in several decisions. In re
Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 407 (D. Mont. 1995) ("RFRA violates the separation of
powers doctrine by setting for the courts a balancing test the Supreme Court has
designated judicially unworkable. The task of defining tests to adjudicate First
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constitutional line that separates, in Justice Harlan's words, "what questions are
appropriate for congressional determination and what questions are essentially
judicial in nature." 226 In short, Congress has interfered with the "province and
duty" of the judiciary "to say what the law is" in free exercise cases and
controversies. 227
A. The Violation of the Cooley Principle of Separation
RFRA, masked as a statutory claim or defense, attempts to "restore" to the
judicial system three things: (1) the pre-Smith judicial reading of the Free
Exercise Clause, making it applicable to neutral and generally applicable laws;
(2) the pre-Smith judicial use of the compelling governmental interest test in
adjudicating free exercise claims; and (3) a judicial recognition and restoration
of the religious exercise rights that follow from use of that pre-Smith judicial
test. And in the course of this restoration process, RFRA seeks to induce all
courts, federal and state, to ignore, if not overrule, the Smith ruling. Thus,
RFRA is a congressional arrow aimed directly at the heart of the independent
judicial function of constitutional interpretation.
To paraphrase what the constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley observed
long ago, a legislative body like Congress cannot, without breaching the line
separating the legislative and judicial functions,
compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law [the
Free Exercise Clause], which... remain[s] in force... [and] cannot thus
indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction
of the [Free Exercise Clause] according to its own views.., or directing what
Amendment rights fall properly with the Judicial Branch."); Hamilton v. Schriro,
1996 WL 11119, at *20 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1996) (McMillian, I., dissenting) ("In
essence, Congress has instructed the Supreme Court how to interpret the Free
Exercise Clause.... It hardly needs to be said that where Congress and the Supreme
Court are so clearly at odds with each other over the definition of a fundamental right,
the conflict presents an obvious and serious threat to the delicate balance of separation
of powers."); State v. Miller, 1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 945, at *16-17 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 7, 1995) (Sundby, J., dissenting) ("I do not accept that Congress may compel the
United States Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment as Congress believes it should be interpreted.")
226 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
227 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This separation principle
has recently been reaffirmed in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453
(1995).
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particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. 228
Yet, that is precisely what RFRA seeks to do. It aims to "compel the
courts for the future to adopt a particular construction" 229 of the Free Exercise
Clause, by forcing the courts to adopt the particular and expanded construction
of the Clause that appears in Section 1(a) and (b) of RFRA.23 ° It tries to
"indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a
construction" of the Free Exercise Clause as restated in Section l(a) and (b) to
reflect Congress' "own views" as to how the Clause should be construed. 231
And RFRA, by prescribing use of the compelling governmental interest test
whenever a RFRA claim or defense is made, certainly directs "what particular
steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry" into a free exercise
claim.2 32 Indeed, courts must employ the constitutional doctrine of balancing in
all free exercise cases brought under RFRA.
RFRA thus violates every precept of Thomas Cooley's observation, which
may appropriately be designated the Cooley Principle of Separation. It is a
principle that applies to both direct and indirect incursions by Congress into the
independent kingdom of the judiciary. And it is a principle that condemns any
such incursion masquerading as the functional equivalent of a separate statutory
right of action.
The Cooley Principle of Separation is fully consistent with, and indeed is a
part of, the Court's modem revival of Madison's pragmatic and flexible
approach to separation of powers.23 3 In Madison's view, the separation
2 2 8 THOMAs CooLEY, CONST1rbrIONAL L.MrrATIONS 94-95 (1868). These remarks by
Judge Cooley were recently quoted by the Supreme Court in Plant, 115 S. Ct. at 1456. The
Court there described Cooley as "the great constitutional scholar." Cooley's "eminence as a
legal authority" has also been said to rival "that of Story." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
105 (1985) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
229 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
230 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993).
231 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
232 Id.
233 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). Madison's pragmatic and
flexible approach is set forth in THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324-26 (James Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). He there wrote that while the Constitution divides the Government into
three co-equal branches, the separation doctrine does not mean that "these departments
ought to have no par/al agency in, or no control over the acts of each other." The
separation doctrine, in other words, allows a certain amount of blending of the three
functions, but does not permit the whole power of one department [to be] exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department." Id.; see also Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
693-94 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976).
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doctrine allows a practical amount of blending of the three governmental
powers. But the doctrine is violated when one branch seeks to exercise the
whole or core powers of another branch. The Cooley Principle is thus but an
elaboration of how the legislative branch violates the separation principle when,
as in RFRA, it seizes the whole or core function of the judiciary in reading,
interpreting and applying the Free Exercise Clause in the context of cases and
controversies. 234
As if to emphasize the indirectness that marks its control of the judicial
process, RFRA makes every effort to distance itself from a direct confrontation
with the Smith reading of the Free Exercise Clause. As we have mentioned, 235
RFRA repeatedly is described as creating a new statutory prohibition on
governmental action, bearing its own standard of review, and "does not
purport to legislate the standard of review to be applied by the Federal courts in
cases brought under that constitutional provision." 236 As expressed by two of
the leading proponents of RFRA:
The Act is only a statute, not a constitutional amendment, but it is a statute
designed to perform a constitutional function. It is designed to restore the
rights that previously existed under the Free Exercise Clause, rights that
Congress believes should exist if the Constitution were properly interpreted.
As a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause, the Act had to be as universal
as the Free Exercise Clause. It had to protect all religions equally against all
assertions of regulatory interests. The only way to draft such a protection was
in the manner of the Free Exercise Clause itself-as a general principle of
universal application. 23 7
234 Justice Powell once wrote that the pragmatic separation doctrine can be violated in
either of two ways: (1) one branch "may interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned function," or (2) one branch may assume "a
function that more properly is entrusted to another." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963
(1983) (Powell, I., concurring). RFRA appears to involve both kinds of violations.
235 See supra part VI.D.
236 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14 n.43.
237 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219. In a similar vein, Justice Thomas has
described RFRA as follows: "as a substitute for constitutional protection, RFRA grants a
statutory 'claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government.'" Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460, 460 n.1
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
Professor Laycock has also observed:
What may make RFRA seem anomalous at first blush is that it appears to attempt
to overule the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. But RFRA would not overrule the
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That is an accurate but provocative statement. It is a statement confirmed
by the very language of RFRA. This statute is truly designed, we are told, "to
perform a constitutional function," thus making it a "quasi-constitutional
statute." We are told that RFRA is "designed to restore the [free exercise]
rights that previously existed," not under a previous statute but under the Free
Exercise Clause itself. And these rights, as encompassed in RFRA, are said to
be those that "Congress believes should exist if the Constitution were properly
interpreted." We are thus being told that Congress, by enacting RFRA,
believes that it can better and more properly interpret the Constitution than the
Supreme Court. And Congress mandates this better interpretation by requiring
the use of a judicial standard of review that has no independent statutory
source. Here is a most egregious violation of the Cooley Principle of
Separation.
By its restorative efforts, RFRA seeks to accomplish indirectly what it
concededly cannot do directly. Even its most ardent supporters acknowledge
that "Congress simply lacks the constitutional authority to override the Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment." 23 8 Or, as Congressman Henry J. Hyde
puts it, "the label 'restoration' in this [RFRA] context is inappropriate.
Congress writes laws-it does not and cannot overrule the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution and thus it is unable to 'restore' a prior
interpretation of the First Amendment." 239 And as the Cooley Principle of
Separation teaches, the legislature cannot "compel the courts to adopt a
particular construction of a law" and thereby "indirectly control the action of
the courts."
The result is the statutory transfer of the judicial power of constitutional
interpretation from the Supreme Court to the Congress. Congress, not the
Supreme Court, thus becomes the ultimate judicial interpreter and enforcer of
the Free Exercise Clause.
Attempts to find constitutional authority for such a breach of the separation
of powers doctrine are non-productive. The legislative history of RFRA shows
Court; rather, it would create a statutory right where the Court declined to create a
constitutional right. This distinction is not a mere formality; it has real
consequences ....
Laycock, supra note 116, at 246.
But in light of repeated statements by RFRA's sponsors that the real purpose is to
overrule Smith by restoring the governmental interest test, the "first blush" refuses to go
away.
238 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 5, at 243.
239 Additional views of Congressman Henry J. Hyde and others are attached to HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 15 n.3.
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only a sparse search for such authority. But from brief remarks in the
committee reports and from the writings of RFRA's proponents, we find that
RFRA purports to rest its congressional authority on two constitutional
provisions: (1) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, sometimes known as a
"little necessary and proper clause," and (2) the original Necessary and Proper
Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. Thus, it is the belief of the House
Judiciary Committee that, by virtue of these two clauses, "the legislative
branch has been given the authority to provide statutory protection for a
constitutional value when the Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its
authority."24° But neither of those constitutional provisions provides any real
validating aid or comfort for RFRA. And so they do demand our attention and
analysis.
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." For
RFRA purposes, there are several structural features of Section 5 to be
stressed. First is the obvious fact that, since the Fourteenth Amendment applies
only to state action, Section 5 empowers Congress to legislate solely to enforce
the obligation of the States to respect the individual rights encompassed by the
Amendment. Section 5 simply does not empower Congress to legislate
respecting any form of federal action.241 Only the Necessary and Proper Clause
of Article I gives Congress such power.
In addition, neither Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Article
I Necessary and Proper Clause represent anything more than an affirmative
grant to Congress of the power to enact necessary and proper legislation to
enforce or execute some other substantive provision of the Constitution.
Whatever statute is enacted pursuant to such power must be related to and find
its ultimate legitimacy in that other provision of the Constitution, be it a
substantive provision of the Fourteenth Amendment or an Article I provision
such as the Interstate Commerce Clause. It is not enough, when assessing the
constitutionality of RFRA, simply to refer to or rely upon Section 5 of the
240 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
241 Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment provisions, the substantive provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which protect the voting rights of citizens against denial or
abridgment on account of race or color, apply to both the United States or any State. Thus,
under the Section 2 enforcing provision of the Fifteenth Amendment (which is the
counterpart of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), Congress can enact enforcing
legislation respecting both federal and state action. See Hamilton, supra note 126, at 376-
77.
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Fourteenth Amendment. More analysis than that is necessary.
Third is the fact that the Free Exercise Clause, being a part of the First
Amendment, becomes a substantive part of the Fourteenth Amendment only by
way of judicial incorporation of the First Amendment into the "liberty" concept
of the Due Process Clause. The First Amendment, which contains no
independent enforcing power, is a part of the Fourteenth Amendment by
sufferance of the Supreme Court's selective incorporation doctrine. It is at this
point that RFRA meets its first Section 5 problem. Does the Section 5 power of
Congress to enforce the "provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to
enforcing "provisions" that are in the Fourteenth Amendment only by reason
of subsequent judicial incorporation? Or is the power limited to enforcing the
Amendment's original "provisions" and purposes, which "were designed
primarily to address the problem of slavery and racial discrimination"? 242 And
since incorporation is solely the product of the judicial process, should not the
scope and interpretation of an incorporated provision be solely the province of
the judiciary? To those questions there are no definitive answers.243
242 Conkle, supra note 15, at 68. Professor Conkle adds that since RFRA addresses
only an incorporated right rather than slavery or racial discrimination, "the core historical
meaning of the Civil War Amendments is not implicated, and there is less reason for the
Court to defer to congressional decisionmaking." Id. at 69; see also Idleman, supra note
116, at 304-07.
243 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court implicitly assumed that
Congress has Section 5 power to incorporate the Eighth Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment. But Congress was found to have used that power in a
remedial fashion, so as to authorize the award of attorneys' fees in civil rights actions
brought against states to enforce the Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel
and unusual punishments. Congress did not there seek to ratchet up any right to
protection against forms of cruel and unusual punishment that had not been recognized
by the Court. Nor did Congress mandate that courts utilize a particular standard of
review in assessing cruel and unusual punishment claims. Hamilton, supra note 126, at
391 n.127.
No other Supreme Court opinion, not even the seminal Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966), has expressly addressed or resolved these questions. The few individual
Justices who have spoken have reached opposite conclusions. Then Justice Rehnquist, for
example, has written that "it is not at all clear to me that... Congress has the same
enforcement power under § 5 with respect to a constitutional provision which has merely
been judicially 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has with respect to a
provision which was placed in that Amendment by the drafters." Hutto, 437 U.S. at 717-18
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Black implied that Congress can
enforce incorporated rights by stating that Section 5 does not empower Congress "to
undermine those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth
Amendment made applicable to the States." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129 (1970)
(individual opinion of Black, J.); see Idleman, supra note 116, at 302-22.
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But even if we assume that Congress does have power to enforce an
incorporated provision like the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA immediately
confronts another constitutional problem. As we have seen, RFRA is certainly
not designed to enforce the Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause or
to enforce the rights protected by that interpretation. Nor is RFRA designed to
create substantive rights of free exercise in order to enforce the current
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Rather, RFRA seeks to restore, or
to induce the courts to restore, a rejected judicial interpretation of the Clause
and a rejected judicial balancing test.244 RFRA makes no pretense of being
other than an indirect and not very subtle attempt by Congress to modify the
judicially determined meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
RFRA thus brings into sharp focus the obvious question whether Section 5
grants Congress the substantive power of restoring a judicially abandoned
mode of constitutional interpretation. 245 That question is made even sharper by
the fact that the Free Exercise Clause is not an affirmative laundry list of
individual free exercise rights. Rather, it is a negative proposition, a limitation
on governmental power.246 What individual rights are cognizable or protectable
under the Clause are largely the result of how one reads the Clause's
restrictions on governmental power. Smith's narrow and absolutist reading
produces far fewer individual rights than a broad balancing approach. RFRA,
in attempting to restore a pre-Smith judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, can only hope that the courts will restore those free exercise rights that
might be recognized were the courts to balance religious exercise burdens as
against some governmental interest in enforcing a neutral, generally applicable
law.
Suffice it to say that there is no basis or authority whatever for ascribing to
Section 5 a congressional empowerment to restore and enforce either (1) a
judicially abandoned mode of interpreting an incorporated provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or (2) the substantive free exercise rights that flow
from judicial use of that abandoned mode. Indeed, there is substantial historical
evidence that Section 5 was never meant to allow Congress to define or revise
the substantive contents of the due process and equal protection guarantees of
Section 1 of the Amendment. Apparently the Amendment's framers meant to
244 See suqra part VI.C.
245 See Conkle, supra note 15, at 46-55. ("Such a fundamental change in the judicially
determined meaning of the Constitution, however, especially with its implications for states'
rights, could not be accomplished by congressional legislation. It would require a
constitutional amendment.") Id. at 55.
246 See Idleman, supra note 116, at 317 (referring to "the prevailing philosophical-
doctrinal understanding of the Bill of Rights as an exposition of negative, as opposed to
positive, rights").
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give Section 5 a remedial purpose only, the purpose being to "enforce" the
substantive provisions by outlawing or providing a remedy for state laws that
Congress deemed to be in violation of the substantive provisions.247 But the
substantive provisions themselves were meant to be defined only by their own
terms or as read by the primary arbiter, the Supreme Court.248
None of the drafters or proponents of RFRA state a convincing case for the
existence of a congressional revisory power respecting the substance of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their major argument is that Section 5 gives
Congress broad powers and that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that
Congress may use this [Section 5] power to define and protect rights that are
more expansive than what the Court has held to be constitutionally
24 7 A noted authority on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment concluded:
[niothing is clearer about the history of the Fourteenth Amendment than that its framers
rejected the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress to meddle with
conditions within the states so as to render them equal in accordance with its own
notions. Rather the framers chose to write an amendment empowering Congress only to
rectify inequalities put into effect by the states. Aence the power of Congress comes
into play only when the precondition of a denial of equal protection of the laws by a
state has been met.
Alexander Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, in 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 75, 97 (Philip B.
Kurland ed., 1966). For another historical view of Section 5, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking
Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1995).
The statements of some of the sponsors and crafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
support the remedial reading of Section 5. Thus, Representative Thaddeus Stevens stated
that Section 5 "allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States." CONG.
GLOxBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan similarly
argued that Section 5 "enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with
the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional
enactment." Id. at 2768.
248 C. Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995),
where the court, in upholding the constitutionality of RFRA, stated:
Even if Congress does lack the power to interpret the Constitution under § 5, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is best justified as an exercise of Congress'
remedial powers under § 5. Under this view of the legislation, Congress has not
attempted to define the First Amendment; rather, it has merely prohibited otherwise
lawful activity as a means of further enforcing constitutional rights.
Id. at 1318.
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protected." 249 But that argument fails to address the nature of RFRA. Congress
is not here "defining" or "protecting" rights "more expansive" than those the
Court found protectable in Smith. Rather, Congress seeks to compel courts to
restore usage of the pre-Smith compelling governmental interest test. It is no
more than a hope or expectation that a congressionally inspired judicial revival
of that constitutional doctrine will produce a "more expansive" list of protected
free exercise rights.
Nor has the Supreme Court "repeatedly held" that Congress may, in this
fashion, expand the list of protected free exercise rights. The leading case
dealing with the scope of Section 5, the 30-year-old Supreme Court decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan,250 sheds no light or encouragement on the RFRA
technique of piling one restoration upon another, i.e., restoring substantive
rights by restoring a judicial mode of constitutional interpretation. Morgan in
no way involves, recognizes, discusses, or approves any such restorative power
under Section 5. Moreover, it is a decision concerned solely with congressional
enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, an original and nonincorporated
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.251
249 Ackerman, supra note 148, at 30.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14 n.41, cites Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
650 (1966), for the proposition that "Section 5 gives Congress 'the same broad powers
expressed in the [Art. 1] necessary and proper clause' with respect to State governments and
their subdivisions."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 asserts that Section 5 gives Congress the authority
"to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value when the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to assert its authority." It further asserts that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly
upheld such congressional action after declining to find a constitutional protection itself." Id.
Appended to the latter statement is footnote 21, citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). All but one of these
citations, plus Katzenbach v. Morgan, are cited in the Ackerman report, supra note 148, at
30 n.129.
250 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
251 In Morgan, Justice Brennan wrote that, "[c]orrectly viewed, Section 5 is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and that the sole issue in Morgan was whether Section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was appropriate legislation "to enforce the Equal Protection Clause."
384 U.S. at 651.
Justice Stevens has recently read Morgan as viewing Section 5 "as a positive grant of
authority in Congress, not just to punish violations, but also to define and expand the scope
of the Equal Protection Clause .... Congress, then, can expand the coverage of § 1 by
exercising its power under § 5 when it acts to foster equality." Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2126 n.11 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see the reference
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The rather cloudy Morgan decision states in a footnote that "Congress'
power under Section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment" but does not grant Congress the authority "to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." 25 2 From that footnote,
commentators have developed a so-called "ratchet theory," which turns around
the negative statement that Congress cannot "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" into
an implied affirmation of power to "add to or extend" the substantive
Fourteenth Amendment rights as recognized by the Supreme Court.25 3 Thus,
like any ratchet, this Section 5 ratchet power is said to go in one direction only,
upward not downward. 25 4 But even if we accept that Congress can, by
adopting a "ratcheting upward" statute, expand an incorporated Fourteenth
Amendment right beyond what the Supreme Court has recognized, RFRA
is simply not such a statute. It bears repetition that RFRA does not aim to
restore any substantive right of free exercise that is unduly burdened by a
generally applicable law. Rather, RFRA concentrates on mandating the
courts, in the exercise of their judicial case or controversy tasks, to do two
things: (1) to interpret the Free Exercise Clause to encompass generally
applicable laws, and (2) to balance such laws against any resulting
in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand to the "different views" of the Justices as
to the authority Section 5 "confers upon Congress to deal with the problem of racial
discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer to Congress' exercise of that
authority." Id. at 2114.
252 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n. 10; see generally GERALD GUNTHER, CoNsTrrIUoNAL
LAW 983-93 (12th ed. 1991).
253 See Laycock, supra note 206. Professor Laycock argues that "a substantive
understanding of the ratchet theory is squarely based in the historical context of the
Fourteenth Amendment and separation of powers." Id. at 155. He also states that this theory
rests on an understanding that the Supreme Court "does not have exclusive power to protect
our liberties or define their scope" and that "[iln the absence of a court order or opinion
constraining the behavior of the other branches, they can act on their own view of liberty or
of the Constitution, and it matters little whether we think of such action as constitutional
interpretation or as something else." Id. at 154.
254 This Morgan footnote discussion, which is the origin of the "ratchet theory," was
inserted into the majority opinion by Justice Brennan in response to Justice Harlan's dissent.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, complained that since the Court seemed to read
Section 5 "as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the
Amendment," why should not Congress "be able as well to exercise its § 5 'discretion' by
enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Professor Laurence Tribe has observed that Justice Brennan's "ratchet theory," as
expressed in Footnote 10, "did not fully explain, however, why congressional power was so
limited; nor did it attempt to reconcile with the principle of judicial review even a one-way
power authoritatively to construe the Constitution." TRIBE, supra note 137, at 343.
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substantial burdens on religious exercises. To state those RFRA
propositions is to reveal the plain violation of the Cooley Principle of
Separation.
Certainly the Constitution is not known for silently distributing
governmental powers by metaphors or ratchets. Neither the Morgan footnote
nor the "ratchet theory" says or explains anything about congressional power
to "restore" guarantees that the Supreme Court, by the interpretive process, has
written out of the constitutional scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does
the "ratchet theory" or Morgan itself imply that Congress may disregard
Supreme Court precedent in the name of increasing Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Moreover, as we have seen, the "remedial theory" underlying Section
5255 may well outweigh or conflict with the "ratchet theory" to the extent that
the latter is used by Congress to extend the substantive provisions of the
Amendment.256
The "ratchet theory," which at the time of its birth in Morgan led to a
spirited dissent by Justices Harlan and Stewart, has never been revisited,
followed, or clarified by the Court. Indeed, the Court on a few occasions has
carefully avoided the issue, while individual Justices have used strong language
in rejecting the existence of such substantive Section 5 power.25 7 And the
255 After exploring RFRA in light of both the "remedial theory" and the
"substantive theory" that are said to underlie the Morgan interpretation of Section 5,
Judge McMillian of the Eighth Circuit has concluded that RFRA does not satisfy either
theory. Hamilton v. Schriro, 1996 WL 11119, at *22 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1995)
(McMillian, J., dissenting from a majority opinion that did not reach or discuss
RFRA's constitutionality). Judge McMillian's ultimate conclusion is that Section 5
does not serve to validate RFRA on either theory. In his words, "RFRA's imposition
of the compelling interest test on all free exercise claims is nothing less than a radical
alteration of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence" and the Court's
"understanding of what the Free Exercise Clause actually means," thereby presenting
"an obvious and serious threat to the delicate balance of the separation of powers." Id.
at *68-*75; see also Conkle, supra note 15, at 47.
256 Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan asserted that the majority opinion "in effect"
reads Section 5 "as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But nowhere
does the majority acknowledge that reading.
257 Thus, in Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981), the
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether Section 5 gives Congress power to create
substantive rights beyond those declared by the Court. The Court again avoided the issue in
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), but four dissenting Justices discussed and
roundly rejected the "ratchet theory" of congressional power in these terms: "Allowing
Congress to protect constitutional rights statutorily that it has independently defined [i.e.,
"independently of our case law"] fundamentally alters our scheme of government." Id. at
262 (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The four
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ensuing academic debates have generally warned that the Morgan "ratchet
theory" of substantive Section 5 power "must be regarded as suspect" and
filled with "judicial skepticism." 258
The most that can be said of Morgan is that it recognizes the unremarkable
proposition that Congress has remedial power under Section 5 to enforce and
effectuate a judicially determined constitutional prohibition on racial
discrimination. 25 9 That holding, however, gives no support to RFRA, which
expressly abjures any remedial enforcement of the Smith reading of the Free
Exercise Clause. Nor, to repeat, does Morgan even pretend to hold that
Congress can enact a statute like RFRA, that it can directly repudiate the
substance of the Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision, or
that it can substitute its own version of such a provision and thereby effectively
amend the Constitution. But Morgan is relevant to RFRA in one critical
dissenters also distinguished Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), as having finally
imposed "a limitation on the extent to which Congress may substitute its judgment for that
of the states and assume this Court's 'role of final arbiter.'" Id.
258 Conkle, supra note 15, at 52; see also Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power"
and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 819
(1986); Idleman, supra note 116; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Consftutional
Detenm'nations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971).
Professor Cox, in the last cited article, makes a trenchant observation that
[n]othing in Morgan suggested that the Court should defer to Congress in the
process of deriving the applicable legal standard from the document [the Constitution]
and other sources of law; the opinion seemed to require Congress to appl' the sane
standard as the Court, merely leaving it free to apply the standard differently where the
application turned upon "questions of fact."
Cox, supra, at 234.
259 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-56. The Court, in this critical portion of its opinion,
gives great deference to the enactment of § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, designed by
Congress "'to secure the [voting] rights under the [equal protection component of the]
fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the
predominate classroom language was other than English.'" Id. at 652 (citation omitted). The
effect of the decision was to nullify a New York voting requirement of English literacy. In
so holding, the Court distinguished its prior holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which sustained a North Carolina English literacy
requirement "as not in all circumstances prohibited by the first sections of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649. Lasiter was said not to present the
issue involved in Morgan, i.e., "[wlithout regard to whether the judiciary would find that
the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so
applied, could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment?" Id.
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respect. The Court there holds that, in assessing the validity of congressional
action taken under Section 5, the Court applies the same standard used in
evaluating actions taken under the original Necessary and Proper Clause in
Article I, Section 8.260 That standard is the historic three-part test formulated in
McCdloch v. Mwyland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 261
Application of the McClloch test to RFRA quickly demonstrates that
Congress acted far beyond its constitutional authority. No statute that so openly
and so completely invades the Article Ill judicial processes and the supremacy
of the Supreme Court's role in constitutional interpretation can possibly survive
this test. To wit:
(1) The first requirement of the McCulloch test is that the statute's "end be
legitimate." But it is impossible to find legitimacy in RFRA's overweening
"end" or "purpose," openly proclaimed in Section 2(b)(2), "to restore the
compelling interest test" and "to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." Add the repeated statements
of RFRA's framers and sponsors that the real purpose of the Act is to overturn
the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and O 'Lone,262 and we are forced to
conclude that Congress simply cannot act with such "ends" in mind. It is the
height of illegitimacy for Congress to seek to control the judicial standards used
in treating free exercise cases and controversies, to mandate or correct a
judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, or to induce the judiciary to
ignore if not overrule Supreme Court decisions. 263 There is no provision in the
260 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
261 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819). Twelve years after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880), the Court
described the scope of congressional power under Section 5 in a manner strikingly similar
to the McCulloch formulation:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohbitions
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.
MI. 262 See supra note 4.
263 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1872), where the Court
voided a statute enacted by Congress in exercise of its enumerated Article IH power to make
exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction, because its "great and controlling purpose"
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Constitution that empowers Congress to legislate such "ends." 264
(2) The second prong of the McCulloch test is that Congress may, in its
discretion, adopt any or "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that [legitinate] end." This "appropriate means" standard is
replicated in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that
Congress shall have power to enforce the Amendment "by appropriate
legislation." But if RFRA's end be illegitimate, no statute seeking to achieve
that illegitimacy can be considered "appropriate" or "plainly adapted."2 65
(3) The last prong of the McCulloch test requires that the congressional
statute be consistent with all other provisions of the Constitution. RFRA fails
this critical part of the test. RFRA's collision with the separation of powers
doctrine, as explicated in the Cooley Principle of Separation, is both obvious
and substantial. And the collision is unprecedented.
Congress has rarely tried to cross the border that separates the
congressional and judicial branches of the Federal Government. Each attempt
has been rebuffed. For more than 200 years, beginning with the 1792
statements of five Supreme Court Justices in Hayburn's Case,266 highlighted by
or end was illegitimate in that the statute was a deliberate "means to an end ... to deny to
pardons granted by the President the effect which this court has adjudged them to have."
Thus, the statute was an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power to grant pardons.
264 In Flores v. City of Boerne, 1996 WL 23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996), the
Fifth Circuit held that RFRA satisfies the first prong of the McCulloch test inasmuch
as RFRA seeks the legitimate end of restoring the pre-Smith compelling interest test in
order to "enforce the right guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment." But that statement begs the critical question whether it is a legitimate
end for Congress to dictate to the courts the judicial standard for judicial enforcement
of the right guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.
265 See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146, where the Court refused to follow the so-called
statutory means of altering the Court's rules of decision in order to achieve the
congressionally declared "end" of impairing the executive pardon power.
In the Flores case, the Fifth Circuit held that RFRA is "plainly adapted" to its
purported end of enforcing free exercise rights by virtue of the remedial power of
Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to find and redress nascent
or disguised violations of the Amendment." Flores, 1996 WL 23205, at *7.
Presumably, such violations result from the judicial Smith-type refusal to find or
redress substantial burdens on religious exercises imposed by neutral and generally
applicable laws. But if RFRA's "end" be illegitimate, creating a congressional
interference with the judicial case or controversy function of reading and applying the
Free Exercise Clause, it is idle to ask whether RFRA is "plainly adapted" to that
illegitimate end. Stated differently, RFRA is "plainly adapted" only to the end of
forcing the courts to use their judicial powers to revise their reading of the Clause and
thus "to find and redress nascent or disguised violations of the Amendment."
266 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Hayburn's Case started in the Supreme Court as
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the 1872 opinion in United States v. Klein,267 and eloquently reaffirmed in
1995 by the ruling in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,268 the Court has
consistently and firmly committed itself to respect and follow the Cooley
Principle of Separation. That is, the Court will not tolerate any congressional
leap over the constitutional line separating the core functions of the legislative
and judicial domains.
Thus in Hayburn's Case, five of the original Supreme Court Justices,
sitting as Circuit judges, ruled that the then-fresh separation of powers doctrine
precluded Congress from acting as a court of errors to review judicial acts or
opinions. 269 And in Klein, the Court first reiterated its pledge to maintain the
constitutional intention "that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the
government .. shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others." 270 The
Court then found that Congress had "inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power" by way of a statute that (1)
"prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way" and (2)
impaired the presidential authority to grant pardons by the indirect method of
"direct[ing] the court to be instrumental to that end." 271 Such a statute, the
Court held, could not be an appropriate instrument toward such legislative and
unconstitutional ends.2 72
mandamus motions to compel three Circuit Courts to proceed with certain statutory
proceedings then pending; but before the Court could act, Congress repealed the offending
statute and thus made it unnecessary for the Court to issue mandamus or render an opinion.
But the Court's official reports do set forth the reasons given by the three courts below for
not pursuing the cases before them. Five of the seven judges in the three courts were
Supreme Court Justices sitting as circuit judges. Included were Chief Justice Jay and Justices
Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and Iredell. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
371,391-92 (1980).
267 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
268 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
269 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410-14. Congress in 1791 had directed the
Circuit Courts to rule on the validity of pension claims made by Revolutionary War
veterans; the findings of the courts were to be reviewable by the Secretary of War and by
the Congress. Three Circuit Courts, in New York, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, wrote
letters to President Washington, asserting that the 1791 Act was unenforceable in the courts
inasmuch as any judicial decision was subject to executive and congressional review and
revision, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine and the independence of the
judiciary. Many historians regard Hayburn's Case as the first instance in which a federal
court held an act of Congress unconstitutional. See Leonard W. Levy, Hayburn's Case, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION 908 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).
270 A7ein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
271 Id. at 146-48.
272 It has also been suggested that, since the substantial burden, compelling interest,
and least restrictive components of RFRA's free exercise test constitute such "vague
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Likewise, in Plaut, the Court first reviewed the historical and
constitutional reasons for establishing the separation of powers doctrine and
renewed its pledge to follow the Cooley Principle of Separation, thus ensuring
that "the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and
executive." 273 The Court proceeded to void a section of the Securities
Exchange Act wherein Congress had sought to interfere with the finality of
judgments by retroactively commanding the courts to reopen final judgments in
certain cases brought under the Act.2 74 Such action by Congress was held to
effect "a clear violation of the separation-of-powers principle." 275
Compared to the situations in Hayburn's Case, Klein or Plaut, RFRA
constitutes a more extensive form of legislative incursion into the independent
realm of the judiciary, in violation of the Cooley Principle of Separation. This
principle, however, appears not to take hold when the congressional act merely
amends an applicable substantive law, which inevitably is statutory in
nature.276 But RFRA cannot be said to have effectively amended any applicable
substantive law. The only possible substantive law in this instance is the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And Congress simply cannot amend
the Constitution by substituting its own interpretation for that of the Supreme
terminology and standards," RFRA may not constitute "appropriate legislation" within the
meaning of Section 5. Idleman, supra note 116, at 311.
273 Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453-56 (1995). The Court
quotes the Cooley Principle, and the Court's reference to keeping the judiciary "truly
distinct" from the other two branches is a quotation from THE FEDERALisT No. 78, at 523
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
27 4 Plau, 115 S. Ct. 1456-58.
275 Id. at 1456.
276 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992); see also United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431-32 (1856). In the Flores opinion, the
Fifth Circuit found that RFRA is not in violation of the separation doctrine inasmuch
as RFRA simply mandates the courts to create "legislatively mandated religious
exemptions" from uniform and generally applicable laws. Flores v. City of Boerne,
1996 WL 23205, at *12 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996). But the Fifth Circuit did not explain
how Congress, without violating the separation doctrine, can enter the judicial arena
of cases and controversies and compel the courts to adjudicate religious exercise
claims in such a way as might result in some unspecified kind of a "religious
exemption" from some unspecified kind of a generally applicable law. Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit admitted that RFRA speaks in "broad generalities" and that its purpose is
to "'turn the [judicial] clock back'" to the day before Smith was decided. Id. at *10
(citation omitted). But the separation doctrine forbids Congress from entering the
judicial clock-setting business or mandating what standard of review the courts must
use in adjudicating constitutional claims.
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Court. That is what dooms RFRA.277
C. The Article I Necessary and Proper Clause
In Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, the Constitution empowers Congress
"ilo make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof." It is upon this Clause, which is the counterpart of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to state action, that RFRA must rest its
case for applying its provisions to federal action.
In the absence of any express power to enforce the provisions of the First
Amendment, Congress must rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify
application of RFRA to federal departments, agencies and officers charged with
executing federal law. And to so apply itself, RFRA calls on us to assume that
it effectively, and without any legislative discussion, amends every statute in
the United States Code, and that it applies to all federal statutes that may be
enacted in the endless future "unless such law explicitly excludes such
application by reference to [RFRA]." 278 And all of this is done in the name of
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The constitutionality of RFRA, in the federal sector, is thus supported by
this argument: If Congress has the necessary and proper power to enact a
bankruptcy or a banking law, then it necessarily has the necessary and proper
power to tack onto that law the judicial balancing approach of RFRA. That
argument is specious. The Necessary and Proper Clause is not an enumerated
277 We do not here address any other inconsistency that RFRA may have with other
provisions of the Constitution, such as federalism principles, Establishment Clause
principles, or Equal Protection Clause principles. See Idleman, supra note 116, at 285-302
(arguing that RFRA's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause "is fundamentally an
open question").
Nor do we pause here to examine the constitutionality of the unique provision in
Section 3(c) of RFRA, which in its application to raising a RFRA "claim or defense" in
judicial proceedings in state courts, asserts: "Standing to assert a claim or defense under this
section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article MI of the
Constitution." See Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Brian A. Stem, Note, An
Argument Against Inposing the Federal Case or Controversy Requirement on State Courts,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77 (1994) (contending that the principles of federalism, as well as the
federal separation of powers doctrine underlying the Article ITI standing requirements,
counsel against applying those requirements when state courts adjudicate federal questions).
278 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V 1993) provides: "This chapter applies to all
Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise,
and whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993."
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grant of substantive power to Congress. It is merely a grant of enacting power,
a power to enact legislation to execute and carry into effect all substantive
powers granted by the Constitution to the Congress or other departments of the
Federal Government.2 79
This road inevitably leads us back to the historic Mcidloch v. Maryland
end-means-consistency test for evaluating the constitutionality of any enactment
stemming from the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is the same test that
Morgan borrowed for use in testing the validity of enactments stemming from
the "little necessary and proper clause," Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. No extended analysis is necessary to conclude that, using the
McCdloch test, the same violation of the Cooley Principle of Separation that
infects RFRA's viability under Section 5 also infects its viability under the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I.
One additional problem is presented by RFRA's wholesale sweep in
amending the United States Code in its entirety. The legislative hearings and
the committee reports, let alone the actual language of RFRA, provide not the
slightest indication that all uniform federal laws and regulations have been
administered in such a way as to burden substantially the religious practices of
the public affected by such laws and regulations. And while "Congress need
[not] make particularized findings in order to legislate," 280 the complete
absence of findings at any stage of the legislative process may make it
exceedingly difficult for the Supreme Court to engage in its "independent
evaluation of constitutionality," 281 while giving due respect to relevant findings
of Congress.
Moreover, if we were to accept RFRA's premise that Congress has the
power to effectuate changes and restorations in constitutional free exercise
doctrines, particularized findings by Congress might be necessary to warrant
such a take-over of the Supreme Court's function. If Congress is to assume that
role, then perhaps it should explain itself much as the Court does in its
opinions. 282
279 This differs from Congress' power to exempt from the scope of any law
religious conduct. See supra part VI.
280 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971).
281 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). See supra part VI.B.
Professor Hamilton has written: "There can be little doubt that permitting Congress to
act in this irresponsible and unconscious manner runs against the well-settled notion that
Congress bears responsibility for ensuring the constitutionality of its own enactments."
Hamilton, supra note 126, at 367.2 82 See Choper, supra note 185, at 305.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion compels at least three conclusions. First, by its
own language and by its repeated expressions of purpose and intent, RFRA
must be condemned as an attempt by Congress to invade the judicial arena of
constitutional interpretation.28 3 Constitutional interpretation, which necessarily
involves development of appropriate judicial standards of review, is at the core
of the judicial process. It is also at the core of the Supreme Court's function as
chief guardian and overseer of the Constitution in the judicial context of
deciding cases and controversies arising under the Constitution. And so when
Congress intrudes upon this core judicial function, directing the courts to
abandon or adopt or restore a particular constitutional interpretation and to
follow a standard of judicial review that Congress prefers, the result is a stark
violation of the separation of powers doctrine, particularly as expressed by the
Cooley Principle of Separation.
The Supreme Court is shorn of its ability to make an independent reading
of the Clause and to develop a standard of review that it considers most
consistent with that reading. The Court has been enjoined from reading the
Clause, as it did in Smith, as excluding neutral and generally applicable laws
that only incidentally burden religious exercises. Nor is the Court free, if it
obeys the RFRA dictates, to reject a balancing or compelling governmental
interest test in assessing such a free exercise claim. RFRA injects itself so far
into the judicial world as to hobble the Supreme Court's ability to be an
independent arbiter of the meaning and application of a constitutional
provision. If RFRA is constitutional, the Court cannot then establish any
uniform or consistent reading of the Free Exercise Clause, or standard of
review, that clashes with what RFRA says. In effect, Congress has said to the
Supreme Court, at least in the free exercise context, that "You must never
forget that it is our statutory version of the Constitution you are
283 The express words of RFRA, as well as the uniform expressions of
congressional intent, make it impossible to interpret RFRA as anything other than a
deliberate and intentional invasion of the judicial power of adjudicating cases and
controversies arising under the Constitution. As stated in Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992), "courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.... When the words of
a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is
complete.'" Id. at 253-54 (citation omitted). And when the plain words of RFRA are
so consistent with the congressional intent to "overrule Smith" and to compel courts,
in adjudicating constitutional cases and controversies, to follow what Congress
believes is a preferable reading of the Constitution, there is no room for alternative
constructions of RFRA to avoid the separation problems.
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expounding."284
A second conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that RFRA sets a
precedent for future Congresses that aim to undo a result or decision of the
Supreme Court which Congress deems an "erroneous" constitutional
interpretation. The history of congressional efforts to reverse or isolate some
politically unpopular decision of the Court is a long one, filled with a variety of
legislative techniques to target and destroy what Congress deems to be an
egregiously "wrong" interpretation of some constitutional provision.285 Most
of those techniques have failed, but not RFRA. Because RFRA has become the
law of the land, unless invalidated, its technique may well become a model for
future congressional forays into the sphere of the judiciary.
One final point: RFRA is a totally unnecessary and unhappy way of
addressing the problems created by the Smith decision. Apart from creating
another constitutional amendment, always a difficult proposition, there are
three simple options open to those concerned with the Smith impact. First, as
Smith itself recognizes, Congress and the state legislatures are free to create
religious exemptions from any uniform and generally applicable law. Congress
and the State of Oregon have done just that with respect to the peyote
component of Smith-legalizing peyote use in religious ceremonies. 286 As
Professor Hamilton has made clear, "[n]o constitutional principle... hinders
2 84 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
285 See Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American Hitory, 18 VAND. L.
REV. 925 (1965). This article catalogues the various devices used by Congress, over the
first 170-year history of the nation, to curb or change some policy or decision of the
Supreme Court. Such devices include the attempted impeachment of the Justices (such as
happened to Justice Samuel Chase in 1804), efforts to curb or alter the judicial review
processes, efforts to change the size of the Court or the qualifications of the Justices, efforts
to regulate, define or curb the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over particular matters
(such as habeas corpus appeals, abortion, public school integration by way of busing,
voluntary school prayer, and Reconstruction Era problems), efforts to repeal the Court's
jurisdiction over state courts, and efforts to reduce the contempt and injunction powers of
the judiciary and to redraw some of the rules of practice and procedure. Most of these
efforts failed. To these devices must be added, of course, the Senate's power to reject
nominations to the Court, and congressional efforts to initiate a constitutional amendment to
overcome a Court decision. See also GuNTHER, supra note 252; HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 366-78 (Paul M. Bator et al. eds., 3d ed.
1988); Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Tern-Forewar& Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Juriefiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17, 18-22 (1981); Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hill:
Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court
Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1992).
286 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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Congress from pledging to meet the highest ideals of religious liberty through
its various exercises of its enumerated powers." 28 7
Second, Congress is totally free to create, by statute, a true federal right of
action to enforce and protect some specified aspects of religious exercise. Such
a free-standing statute can contain its own purposes and its own standards of
judicial review and need have no symbiotic relationship to the Free Exercise
Clause or its related jurisprudence. Congress does indeed have constitutional
power to ratchet up First and Fourteenth Amendment individual rights
recognized but perhaps not fully developed by the Supreme Court. Witness the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, or the Title VII employment discrimination
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the federal Age Discrimination
Act-none of which use the RFRA technique of rewriting a constitutional
provision and directing the courts to enforce the rewritten version.
Lastly, the most effective solution for those who find the Smith decision so
distasteful is to ask the Court, in a proper case, to reconsider and overrule the
Smith reading of the Free Exercise Clause. The dynamics surrounding Smith do
seem to indicate that the Court might be receptive to such a request. It was,
after all, a hotly contested 5-to-4 decision on the basic question of how to read
and apply the Clause.28 8 And Justice Souter, appointed to the Court after the
Smith decision, has already invited a re-examination of Smith. In his Hialeah
concurrence, Justice Souter said that, because Smith did not overturn any of the
pre-Smith jurisprudence: "[W]e are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence in
tension with itself, a tension that should be addressed, and that may legitimately
be addressed, by reexamining the Smith rule in the next case that would turn
upon its application." 28 9
Justice Souter also described Smith as having little stare decisis strength
because the rule of law it announced was "unnecessary to the outcome of the
case, especially one not put into play by the parties, [and thus] approaches
without more the sort of 'dicta . . . which may be followed if sufficiently
persuasive but which are not controlling." 290
The author of the Smith majority opinion, Justice Scalia, has suggested the
287 Hamilton, supra note 126, at 369.
2 88 One of those joining the 5-person majority in Smith, Justice White has since
retired. But three of the four dissenters in Smith have also retired: Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Of the four new Justices (Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer),
only Justice Souter has expressed so much doubt about Smith as to call for its re-
examination. See Church of Lukumi Babau Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240
(Souter, I., concurring).
289 Id. at at 2243.
290 Id. at 2247 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627
(1935)).
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same kind of salve for the Smith critics: seek reconsideration. Indeed, that
suggestion can be taken as a subtle invitation to those critics to petition the
Court, in an appropriate case, to revisit and reexamine Smith. Speaking before
the Supreme Court Historical Society in 1994, Justice Scalia observed that his
opinion in Smith
did not form the basis for a private exemption from generally applicable laws
governing conduct-so that a person could not claim a right to use a proscribed
psychotropic drug (peyote) in religious ceremonies. There again, the decision
on the point was 5-4, maling clear to one and all (and to fiaure litigants, in
particular) that this is a controverted and thus perhaps changeable portion of
our jurisprudence.291
Justice Scalia also put Smith in the category of cases where dissents are
"most likely to be rewarded with later vindication" and where counsel are
emboldened "in later cases to try again, and to urge an overruling-which
sometimes, although rarely, occurs."292
Unfortunately, the entrance of RFRA into the free exercise jurisprudence
may long prolong, if not extinguish, any opportunity to accept these invitations
to re-examine and perhaps overrule Smith. By commanding the courts to apply
the compelling governmental interest test to all free exercise cases involving
neutral and generally applicable laws, RFRA not only isolates the Smith rule
but makes it virtually impossible to create what Justice Souter said is "the next
case that would turn upon its [the Smith rule's] application." That "next case,"
the one that might cause a re-examination of Smith, may never surface as courts
will now be immersed in RFRA-type cases.
In sum, RFRA succeeds only in muddying rather than clearing the
291 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SuP. Cr. HIsT. 33, 38 (emphasis
added).
292 Id. (footnote omitted). It is at this point in his remarks that Justice Scalia cited three
recent instances where the Court had overruled earlier 5-to-4 constitutional rulings: United
States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Scalia, supra note 291, at 44
n.2.
In the Payne case, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the rule of stare decisis is not an
inexorable command, especially in constitutional cases where "'correction through
legislative action is practically impossible.'" 501 U.S. at 828 (quoting Burnet v. Coonado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). He then observed that "the
Court has during the past 20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous
constitutional decisions ... [some of which] were decided by the narrowest of margins,
over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have
been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent
application by the lower courts." Id. at 828-29.
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jurisprudential waters surrounding the Free Exercise Clause. It should be
appropriately buried so that the Court can get back to its historic business of
interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the principles of Marbury v.
Madison. And Congress should abandon this ill-conceived attempt to enter the
judicial "case or controversy" arena and to dictate how the Free Exercise
Clause should be interpreted and applied in that arena.

